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Introduction
On October 4, 1994, a judge in the Northern District of California
outlawed California's gas chamber, declaring it "cruel and unusual
punishment"' barred by the Eighth Amendment.2 Judge Patel's deci-
sion was the first federal court opinion to outlaw any method of exe-
cution, and only the second attempt by the federal courts to decide
what limits the Eighth Amendment places on the methods of lawful
killing .3
The first substantive decision on the constitutionality of a method
of execution occurred only months earlier, in Campbell v. Wood,4
where a bitterly divided limited-en banc panels of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found hanging permissible
under the Eighth Amendment.
Given the deep divisions over Campbell and Fierro among thejudges of the Ninth Circuit,7 the fate of Judge Patel's Fierro decision
will probably be decided by the luck of the draw when the panel re-
viewing the case is picked. If the Ninth Circuit affirms, the result will
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
3. But see infra notes 78-81 (discussing Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983)).
4. 18 F.3d 662 (6-5 decision) (9th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 20 F.3d 1050
(6-5 decision) (9th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
5. The Ninth Circuit does not actually review en banc cases en banc. Rather, a panel
comprised of the Chief Judge and ten other judges is picked from the circuit's twenty-seven
active judges to decide the case. 9th Cir. R. 35-3.
6. See infra notes 104-25.
7. See infra note 13.
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be a split in the circuits' and virtually certain review in the Supreme
Court.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the
constitutionality of a method of execution. The Court has never even
articulated what criteria the lower courts should use to decide the is-
sue. This Note will explore (1) the reasons for, and results of, this
historical omission; (2) the lessons to be learned, if any, from
"landmark" Eighth Amendment cases; (3) a three-part inquiry neces-
sary to decide the issue systematically, taking into account the mean-
ing and importance of "human dignity" in the execution context; (4)
Eighth Amendment tests the Court might choose from, including my
suggested formulation for such a test; and (5) the constitutionality of
the various methods of execution currently in use, including the gas
chamber.
I. After Over a Century, An Issue of First Impression
On April 21, 1992, Robert Alton Harris became the first person
to die in California's gas chamber since the reinstitution of the state's
death penalty in 1977. Harris, convicted in 1979 of the kidnapping
and murder of two sixteen year-old boys, had lost some twelve ap-
peals on his behalf by March of 1992.9
On April 17, 1992, in the frantic week culminating in the execu-
tion, Harris' attorneys fied a class-action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198310
8. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text; notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
The decision would also conflict with several decisions by state courts of last resort. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. State, 32 P.2d 18 (Ariz. 1934); People v. Daugherty, 256 P.2d 911 (Cal.
1953); Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45,70 (Md. 1983); Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss.
1984); State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676 (Nev. 1923).
9. See Deirdre J. Cox, Note, The Robert Alton Harris Decision: Federalism, Comity,
and Judicial Civil Disobedience, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 155, 158, 208-09 (1993).
Harris never got a hearing on what his attorneys contend was the central issue in the case:
whether his brain damage, post-traumatic stress syndrome, and fetal alcohol syndrome cast
doubt on his culpability, and whether the state's psychiatrist was remiss in ignoring the
evidence of brain damage in his testimony at trial. See Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Lau-
rence, Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents: The Death Penalty Case of Robert
Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REv. 345, 361 n.49 (1992) (describing the brain damage); id. at
366 (calling the psychiatric claim the "fundamental" issue of the case). Although a Ninth
Circuit panel denied Harris' first federal petition, Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.
1990), Harris' motion to rehear the case en banc lost by a tie vote of thirteen to thirteen.
Sevilla & Laurence, supra, at 366.
10. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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on behalf of Harris and the other inmates on San Quentin Prison's
death row.. The suit alleged that execution by cyanide gas constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, and it sought to enjoin the state from
carrying out Harris' scheduled execution." The claim was filed as a
§ 1983 action rather than as a habeas corpus petition to avoid the con-
siderable procedural problems attendant to eleventh-hour successor
habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases.' 2
United States District Judge Patel issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) to allow time for a hearing on the constitutionality of the
gas chamber.' 3 The TRO was vacated by a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reinstated by other judges in
the Ninth Circuit,' 4 and vacated again by the United States Supreme
Courte 5 without anyone addressing the substance of the claim. 6
Despite Harris' execution, Fierro v. Gomez continued as a class
action on behalf of San Quentin's remaining death row inmates.
Freed from the procedural and time constraints that accompany last-
minute death penalty appeals, Judge Patel had the unusual luxury of
holding an eight-day trial'7 solely on the issue of the gas chamber's
constitutionality. She then took nearly a full year after the trial to
decide the case. 8
11. Cox, supra note 9, at 209. The ACLU decided to pursue the action after hearing
descriptions of the April 6, 1992 execution of Don Harding, see infra note 84, in Arizona's
gas chamber. Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 9, at 373.
12. The use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a method of execution was not wholly
unprecedented. See Poyer v. Murray, 113 S. Ct. 2397 (1993) (Souter, J., with Stevens and
Blackmun, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski,
Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 295, 301
n.17 (1992); Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 9, at 376.
13. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992) rev'd sub nom. Gomez v.
United States Dist. Ct., No. 92-70237, 1992 WL 155238 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1992) (order and
dissenting opinion published at 966 F.2d 460 with the court's opinion omitted) withdrawn
as moot, 966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1992). Although technically withdrawn as moot, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion reversing Judge Patel was actually withdrawn because it was considered
flawed. Wells By and Through Kehne v. Arave, 18 F.3d 658, 662, 662 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Normally, a withdrawn opinion is never published. In this case,
however, Judge Patel ordered the panel's opinion published in the Federal Supplement as
an appendix to her order following remand, see Gomez v. United States District Court, 790
F. Supp. 972, 972-75 (N.D. Cal. 1992), presumably to make public how far some judges on
the circuit were willing to go to keep the Harris execution on schedule.
14. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1992) (cited in Cox, supra
note 9 at 210).
15. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992).
16. See id. at 1656 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a chronology of the Harris litigation,
see Cox, supra note 9, at 203-212; Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 12, at 315. For a de-
tailed explanation of each step, including why the process took as long as it did, see Sevilla
& Laurence, supra note 9, at 351-379.
17. See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1389.
18. Fierro went to trial on October 26, 1993, and was decided on October 4, 1994. By
contrast, Judge Patel produced the initial decision laying out a potential Eighth Amend-
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In recent years, death penalty lawyers across the country have
shown increasing interest in fighting particular methods of execution,
including the gas chamber, on Eighth Amendment grounds. 19
ment test-in the order granting the original TRO-in approximately 36 hours. See Cox,
supra note 9, at 209.
19. This sudden interest may come out of desperation. Besides the fact that death
penalty attorneys are generally ambivalent about whether the issue ought to be dealt with
at all, the relief to be won, a less painful death, is perceived as slight compared to reversal
of a sentence or a guilty verdict itself, the usual goal. See Lonny J. Hoffman, Note, The
Madness of the Method: The Use of Electrocution and the Death Penalty, 70 TEXAS L. REv.
1039, 1041 n.11 (1992); Philip R. Nugent, Note, Pulling the Plug on the Electric Chair: The
Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 185, 185 (1993).
Many people share the opinion that the issue of the relative cruelty of different meth-
ods of execution ought not to be litigated at all. In fact, an Indiana bill proposing a change
in the state's method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection was defeated by
the combined forces of both the pro and anti-death penalty lobbies, neither of whom
wanted to see executions made more humane. William Ecenbarger, Killing By The Book,
Executions Are Gruesome And Horrifying-Just Ask The Witnesses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan.
23, 1994, at 10.
On the abolitionist side, the criticism is severalfold: first, because state killings are
inherently abhorrent to human dignity, reflect terrible social policy, and are disproportion-
ately directed against racial and ethnic minorities, it is counting angels on pinheads to
worry about how the condemned prisoner spends the last fifteen minutes of her life; and
second, that even if the litigation is successful, and all states switch to a less painful and
degrading method like lethal injection, the result will only make the death penalty more
palatable to the public, and perhaps prolong its use. See, ag., STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE
EXECUTION PROTOCOL 176-77 (1992) (death row inmate contending that Missouri's switch
from the gas chamber to lethal injection has weakened the Missouri public's opposition to
the death penalty); Ian Fisher, Merits of Lethal Injection Are Questioned By Its Foes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at B5 ("'It is precisely because [lethal injection] falsely appeals to the
sense of medical technology and efficiency and humaneness and painlessness that it is in-
tended to make the process of sentencing people to death and executing them easier on
everybody,' said Henry Schwarzchild, director of the New York office of the National Coa-
lition to Abolish the Death Penalty. 'That's the true horror of it."'). In fact, the ACLU has
stated its opposition to litigating the issue for fear of prolonging the existence of capital
punishment. See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Exe-
cution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 551, 558
n.32 (1994). Thus, the ACLU's decision to file Fierro was apparently a reversal of earlier
policy.
On the pro-death penalty side, I hear complaints that these legal arguments are noth-
ing but stalling tactics designed to slow the wheels of justice. See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders,
Can The Death Penalty Be Humane?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 1994, at A21. In other words,
the two sides seem to agree that the cruelty with which the penalty is inflicted pales in
significance to the fact of the execution itself.
Perhaps that is the case. I am a pragmatist, and I oppose the death penalty primarily
for practical reasons: 1) it is too expensive (see DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (Jan. 26, 1995) (death penalty costs California $90
million per year above normal criminal justice costs); James Coates, The Noose Tightens,
America Could Witness A Surge In Executions, Cmi. TRIB., Aug. 19, 1990, at 1 (General
Accounting Office estimates cost of each execution at $1.8 million, compared to $650,000
for life in prison without parole); see generally DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
MILLIONS MISSPENT. WHAT POLITICIANS DON'T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COSTS OF THE
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DEATH PENALTY (Richard C. Dieter, author 1994); Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of
Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1221 (1985));
Sam Howe Verhovek, Across the U.S., Executions Are Neither Swift Nor Cheap, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al; 2) it doesn't prevent crime in any measurable way (VICrOR E.
KAPPELER, MARK BLUMBERG, & GARY W. POTrER, THE MYTHOLOGY OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 214-22 (1993) (most studies show no deterrent effect for the death pen-
alty, and the one major study that did was significantly flawed); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 14 (1986) ("In
reality, the death penalty is about as relevant to controlling violent crime as rain-dancing is
to controlling the weather."); id. at 167-84 (concluding, after reviewing the major deter-
rence studies, that (1) the deterrent effect of the death penalty has never been accurately
measured, and (2) that no one involved in the debate on either side really cares); for an
extensive list of sources on deterrence and the death penalty, see John D. Bessler, Televised
Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First Amendment Right of Access to State
Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 356 n.1 (1993)); 3) it may actually encourage some
killings, Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 853, 877
(1987) ("the case histories... demonstrate that some defendants kill so that society will
execute them"); and 4) 1 doubt that our justice system is capable of imposing it fairly, see
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(contending that the legal system is incapable of reconciling the demands of individual
fairness and of consistency in capital sentencing); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,286-87
(1987) (describing the "Baldus study," which reveals capital sentencing disparities in Geor-
gia based on the race of the defendant and/or the victim); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
364-65 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing similar statistics); DEATH PENALTY INFOR-
MATION CENTER, FACrs AnOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (Jan. 26, 1995) (85% of death
penalty cases involve a white victim although 50% of murder victims are black; of the 71
people executed for interracial murders since 1976, 69 were black (white victim) and two
were white (black victim)); Another Biased Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1994, at
A22 (in cases where the Justice Department has chosen to seek the death penalty under
the 1988 "drug kingpin" law, only 4 out of the 37 defendants so charged have been non-
Hispanic whites, even though 75% of federal drug trafficking defendants are non-Hispanic
whites). I also believe, however, that the death penalty encourages crime by undercutting
the general belief in the sanctity of human life and the importance of the feelings of others.
See infra note 206. This is perhaps the greatest irony of all, and the only argument that
cannot be dismissed by someone willing to pay the price for retribution.
I can't help thinking that as long as we are stuck with the death penalty (as we will no
doubt be for years to come, based on its popularity) we ought to try to minimize its poten-
tially destructive societal effects. By teaching a modicum of respect for the condemned in
their final moments, perhaps we might reclaim some tiny portion of the respect for life of
which capital punishment robs us.
Further, litigating the issue keeps it in the public eye. Most people think that execu-
tions are quick and painless. See the closing moments of the recent NBC SUNDAY NIGHT
MoVIE: WrrNESS TO THE EXECUTION (television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1994) (on file with
author) for a popular, sanitized view of electrocution, possibly the most horrible of all
methods in reality. People support the death penalty in theory without knowing how the
prisoners are actually killed. By forcing people to confront the ugly truth of the death
penalty, perhaps we can hasten its abolition after all.
Finally, prisoners really do suffer in their final moments of life, and those who wish to
minimize their own pain would not be discouraged from litigating the issue simply because
of the possible consequences to those that follow them. The duty of every defense attorney
fighting a death penalty appeal is to the client first and foremost. The attorney who loses
sight of that has ceased to do her job.
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They have not stopped any executions, although there have been
some small successes.
North Carolina recently executed an inmate in its gas chamber
after the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the question of the
gas chamber's legality.20 In Maryland, however, a death row prisoner
named Donald Thomas mounted a more successful challenge.
Thomas first sought access to the videotape of the Harris execution
for use in Thomas' own lawsuit.2' Judge Patel denied his request22
and later ordered the tape destroyed.3 Another federal court, how-
ever, ordered the state to allow Thomas' attorney to videotape the
Maryland execution of John Thanos.24 In response to the order, the
Maryland Legislature passed a bill mandating the use of lethal injec-
tion but allowing prisoners to affirmatively choose the gas chamber as
an alternative.25
Electrocution, the sole method of execution in eleven states,26
continues to generate controversy as well. IWo years ago, a case chal-
lenging the constitutionality of electrocution reached the Supreme
Court, and although the Court denied certiorari, three justices voted
to hear the case.27
In any case, the recent upsurge of such litigation may be a result of the push by the
conservative wing of the Supreme Court to "streamline" the capital appeals process
through devices like the refusal to apply new rules of constitutional law retroactively, see
infra note 82 (discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)), which has stripped the
capital defendant of the ability to get many of her claims heard. Questions of the govern-
ment's fundamental power to punish, however, remain viable on habeas, see Teague, 489
U.S. at 311, and presumably legality of a particular method of execution under the Eighth
Amendment is such a question (but see Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. at 2125, 2126 n.3
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[Pletitioner's claim [that hang-
ing is unconstitutional] might constitute a new rule under Teague v. Lane.").
20. See Lawson v. Dixon, 114 S. Ct. 2700 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). North Carolina is the only remaining state, besides California, where the gas
chamber is the default method for inmates refusing to choose a method. No state retains
the gas chamber as its sole method, although Mississippi, which is switching to lethal injec-
tion, continues to use lethal gas for inmates sentenced before July 1, 1984. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-51 (1994).
21. Fierro v. Gomez, No. C-92-1482 MHP, 1993 WL 414673, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13,
1993).
22. Id.
23. Sabra Chartrand, Given a Push, Maryland Alters Its Death Penalty, N.Y. TiMEs,
Mar. 25, 1994, at B12.
24. In re Thomas, 155 F.R.D. 124, 125 (D. Md. 1994).
25. Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Chartrand, supra note
22, at B12; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 627 (1994).
26. Denno, supra note 19, at 625 n.492. Of the 261 people executed in the United
States since 1976, 113 have died in the electric chair. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, FACTs ABoUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (Jan. 26, 1995).
27. See Poyner v. Murray, 113 S. Ct. 2397 (1993) (Souter, J., with Stevens and Black-
mun, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari).
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In February 1993, a Virginia state court set a date for a hearing on
the constitutionality of electrocution; in response, the Commonwealth
dropped the capital murder charge in the case rather than try the
issue.28
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Campbell, which finds hanging
permissible, is the first federal court opinion to decide the constitu-
tionality of a method of execution. Campbell by no means guarantees
the constitutionality of any other method, however, since it was de-
cided by the narrowest of margins (6-5) and on the basis of a trun-
cated evidentiary record.29 Further, Judge Patel managed to outlaw
the gas chamber even following the strictures of Campbell.30
II. Reasons No Standard Exists for Deciding Which
Executions are "Cruel and Unusual"
A. Structural Reasons
Ever since the Supreme Court first heard argument on methods
of execution and the Eighth Amendment in Wilkerson v. Utah,31
courts have been reluctant to create standards for deciding what pun-
28. See Nugent, supra note 19, at 195 (citing Commonwealth v. White, Criminal No.
8129, Va. Cir. Ct. (Loundon County 1993)).
Capital prisoners in Virginia, like those in California, now have a choice between the
state's old method (in Virginia, the electric chair) and lethal injection. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-234 (Michie 1994). Although one might think that the issue has become moot be-
cause of the existence of the choice, it has not. First, some inmates may refuse to partici-
pate in the process of choosing, as did David Mason, who died in the California gas
chamber on August 24, 1993. Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1391. In fact, of the twenty-four
California inmates offered the choice thus far, sixteen have refused to make the choice. Id.
Second, as the Campbell court readily admitted, the existence of a choice between a
constitutional and an unconstitutional method of punishment does not moot the issue.
That occurs only if the inmate makes it moot by choosing the constitutionally permissible
punishment. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 680-81; but see State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 266-67
(Mont. 1993) (existence of choice renders question of constitutionality of hanging moot,
even where inmate refuses to choose and is therefore subject to hanging); DeShields v.
State, 534 A.2d 630, 638-39 (Del. 1987).
29. See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1413 n.32; infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. In
rejecting both the motion for rehearing and the suggestion that the full court rehear the
case en banc, the Campbell majority took the unusual step of denying a request for a stay
of execution to allow the Supreme Court to consider the application for certiorari. See
Campbell v. Wood, 20 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) ("find[ing] that exceptional circum-
stances justify denying the stay in this case"). Judge Reinhardt, writing for three of the five
dissenting members of the en banc panel, commented: "If this case does not warrant a stay
pending certiorari, I cannot think of one that would." Id at 1052 (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing). In fact, three justices voted to grant certiorari, so Campbell fell one vote short. See
Campbell v. Wood, 114 S.Ct. 2125 (1994) (Blackmun, J., wrote an opinion dissenting from
denial of certiorari, while Ginsberg and Stevens, JJ., dissented without opinion).
30. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
31. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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ishments violate the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause. That
reluctance is understandable given the historical pattern surrounding
the emergence of each new method of execution. Typically, a new
method is introduced and billed as being more "humane" or "enlight-
ened" than the method in use at the time.32 Empirical testing involv-
ing human subjects is impossible, so the claims of the new method's
promoters are difficult to refute; the legislature therefore adopts the
new procedure for humanitarian reasons, but based on scant scientific
evidence.33 The first challenge comes quickly, usually by the first in-
mate facing execution by the new method. 4 The challenge loses
based on the legislature's humane intent and the lack of evidence of
cruelty.35 This initial decision is often somewhat provisional in its lan-
guage, with the court assuming that the executions will be carried out
in the most humane manner possible.36
32. See infra notes 33, 35, and 36.
33. See, e.g., In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210,211 (Mass. 1901) (electrocution was adopted by
the Legislature "precisely because it is instantaneous"; court upholds it on that basis); State
v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923) ("[O]ur Legislature, in [choosing execution by gas,]
sought to provide a method of inflicting the death penalty in the most humane manner
known to modem science."); Denno, supra note 19, at 566-77 (showing that commercial
interests, rather than scientific evidence, led to the adoption of the first electrocution stat-
ute); Nugent, supra note 19, at 190 (first adoption of electrocution based only on one doc-
tor's having seen one man accidentally electrocuted).
34. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 19, at 556 (William Kemmler challenging electric
chair); MICHAEL KRONENWETrER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 81
(1993) (Gee Jon challenging gas chamber).
35. See, e.g., Gee Jon, 211 P. at 682 ("The Legislature has determined that the infliction
of the death penalty by the administration of lethal gas is humane, and it would indeed be
not only presumptuous, but boldness on our part, to substitute our judgement for theirs,
even if we thought differently upon the matter."); People v. Daugherty, 256 P.2d 911, 922-
23 (Cal. 1953) (quoting Gee Jon extensively in upholding the prospective use of Califor-
nia's new gas chamber); In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 210 (Mass. 1901) ("[W]hen, as here, the
means adopted are chosen with just the contrary intent [rather than cruelty], and are de-
vised for the purpose of reaching the end proposed as swiftly and painlessly as possible, we
are of opinion that they are not forbidden by the constitution."); Hoffman, supra note 19,
at 1043 (in In re Kemmler, the state trial court found electrocution potentially painless
based only on expert testimony; the only actual evidence was a few electrocutions con-
ducted on animals, and those results were ignored).
36. See, e.g., Gee Jon, 211 P. at 681-82 ("For many years animals have been put to
death painlessly by the administration of poison gas. Gas has been used for years by dental
surgeons for the purpose of extracting teeth painlessly.... We must presume that the
officials intrusted [sic] with the infliction of the death penalty by the use of gas ... will
carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment."); In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 818 (Sup. Ct.
1889) (holding that electrocution is not cruel and unusual because the cruelty results only
from mistakes in the application of electricity, not in the use of electricity per se); In re
Kemmler, 24 N.E. 6 (N.Y. [Cayuga] County Ct. 1889) (quoted in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436,442 (1890)) (holding that Kemmler had not shown that "a force of electricity sufficient
to kill any human subject with celerity and certainty, when scientifically applied, cannot be
generated"); see also Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966, 970 (N.D. Cal.) (opinion granting
TRO) ("The holding in Daugherty [see supra note 35] was based on the assumption that
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The courts properly defer to the legislature in rendering these de-
cisions, since they do not yet have a factual basis for re-evaluating the
legislatures' success in fulfilling the stated humanitarian goal. Unfor-
tunately, when time and experience show that the new method does
not work as it was intended, later challenges are summarily dismissed,
with the courts citing the earlier provisional decision as controlling.37
As a result, the method of execution is judged only on how it is sup-
posed to work in theory, and never on how it actually works in
practice.38
Courts are reluctant to scrutinize the relative cruelty of execution
methods for other reasons as well. First, most methods have the theo-
retical potential to kill quickly and painlessly. In reality they are often
carried out by ill-trained and ill-equipped personnel with little regard
for the complexity of killing without inflicting pain.3 9 Mishaps are fre-
quent.40 Add to this the relative rarity of executions,41 the strict con-
lethal gas was the most humane method of execution."), rev'd sub nom. Gomez v. United
States Dist. Ct., 966 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), withdrawn as moot, 966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), va-
cated, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992).
37. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 130 (Cal. 1968) (citing Daugherty [see supra
note 35])("The fact that.., the death penalty is inflicted by the administration of 'a lethal
gas' does not render the punishment cruel or unusual."); see also infra note 53.
38. Although Campbell was decided recently (Feb. 8, 1994), it follows this pattern
closely. The District Court in Campbell had excluded all evidence of hangings other than
that of Westley Allan Dodd, hanged on Jan. 5, 1993 in Washington, since no other hangings
had taken place under Washington's new hanging procedure. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 685-86;
see also infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. Thus, by ignoring the world's hundreds
of years of experience with hanging, the court was able to treat the Washington procedure
as if it were a newly created method. Accord Campbell, 18 F.3d at 713 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
39. See, eg., Campbell, 18 F.3d at 714 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The state did not
consult a single medical expert in developing the [hanging] protocol."); id. (adding "the
prison employs only relatively untrained physician's assistants for the task of conducting a
medical inspection of the prisoner"); Denno, supra note 19, at 650-51 (1994) (describing
Florida officials' decision to forego spending $3,425 for a new leg electrode for the Florida
electric chair, opting instead to make a substitute using a copper strip and an old army
boot, with gruesome results); id. at 651-52 (replacement of worn natural sea sponge in
Florida chair's headpiece with common household sponge); id. at 646-649 (noting various
examples of alleged incompetence by Virginia officials in maintaining "Old Sparky," Vir-
ginia's electric chair, and in conducting electrocutions). The problem is exacerbated by
health professionals' general unwillingness to participate in the actual killing process. See
infra note 234.
40. One expert conservatively estimates the percentage of botched executions since
the reinstatement of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), at nine
percent, although the true figure may be much higher. See Denno, supra note 19, at 662-
63.
41. See Campbell 18 F.3d at 700 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[W]ith the exception of
South Africa and a few small Caribbean states, there has not been another judicial hanging
[besides that of Westley Allan Dodd] in the entire English-speaking world since 1966.")
(footnote omitted). The pace of executions is accelerating, however, 157 people were exe-
cuted between 1976 and 1991. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FActs
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trols on the number of witnesses,42 the absence of any useful judicial
standards against which witnesses can assess what occurs, and the fact
that the only people who can testify to the actual level of pain are by
definition unavailable for subsequent comment. Courts have a hard
time enforcing the Eighth Amendment in the death chamber in the
face of such obstacles.
B. The "Landmark Cases"
In the face of these obstacles, it should come as no surprise that
the jurisprudence is sparse. Although several cases are widely cited as
support for the constitutionality of one or another method of execu-
tion, a closer look reveals that their holdings are invariably far more
narrow, or that their view of the Constitution is obsolete.
Wilkerson, one of the Supreme Court's earliest Eighth Amend-
ment cases, is sometimes cited for the proposition that the firing squad
is constitutional.43 Wilkerson was convicted of murder in the territory
of Utah, which by an 1852 statute prescribed either hanging, shooting
or beheading, in the judge's discretion, as the method of execution.44
However, the Revised Penal Code of 1876 replaced that provision and
failed to specify an execution method.45 The trial judge imposed
shooting, and the defendant appealed, arguing that the method-of-ex-
ecution decision was no longer within the trial court's jurisdiction.
ABouT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (Jan. 26, 1995). However, 100 people were executed be-
tween 1992 and 1994, and six more went to the nation's death chambers in January of 1995
alone, four of them in Texas. See id. (four executions between Jan. 1 and Jan. 26, 1995, two
of them in Texas); Texas Carries Out Double Execution, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1995, at A3
(two more Texas executions on Jan. 31, 1995). 1994 was a landmark execution year, with
Idaho, Maryland, and Nebraska conducting their first executions since 1976. See DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABoUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (Jan. 26, 1995).
Arkansas executed five prisoners, more than it had in the previous eighteen years com-
bined. Id. All pale in comparison to Texas, however, which executed fourteen in 1994. 1&
at 1. As of October 1994, 2,948 prisoners sat on America's death rows. Id. at 2.
42. For a list of the state statutes governing the selection of execution witnesses, see
Bessler, supra note 19, at 368-72. See also infra notes 193, 199, and accompanying text for
a discussion of the ways government tends to hide details of executions.
43. Although commentators frequently cite Wilkerson for this proposition, (see, e.g.,
Gailon W. McGowen, Jr., An Opportunity to Address the Merits: Barefoot v. Estelle, 17
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 83, 97 n.94 (1985); Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in the
United States and Internationally Regarding Capital Punishment, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 523,
527-28 (1993); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Drugs and Death. Congress Authorizes the Death
Penalty for Certain Drug-Related Murders, 18 J. CoNTEMp. L. 47,67 & n.85 (1992); Jennifer
Buehler, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: Rejecting the Serious Injury Requiremen But Em-
bracing the Malicious-And-Sadistic Standard, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 683, 691 n.50 (1993);
Nugent, supra note 19, at 188), only one court has ever directly followed Wilkerson in
upholding shooting as constitutional, and it seemed to do so reluctantly. See Andrews v.
Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 413 (C.D. Utah 1984).
44. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 132 (1878).
45. Id.
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Defense counsel argued that because the territorial legislature had
eliminated the earlier legislative act, only hanging, the method chosen
by Congress for use by Federal authorities, was permissible in Utah.
Before rejecting the jurisdictional argument, the court discussed
shooting in light of the Eighth Amendment:
Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitu-
tion, but the authorities referred to are quite sufficient to show
that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the
death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not
included in that category, within the meaning of the eighth
amendment [sic]. Soldiers convicted of desertion or other capi-
tal military offenses are in the great majority of cases sentenced
to be shot, and the ceremony for such occasions is given in Feat
fullness by the writers upon the subject of courts-martial.4
While apparently unequivocal, the Wilkerson holding is less than
dispositive for several reasons. First, the statement is pure dicta: the
defendant never even claimed that shooting violated the Eighth
Amendment.47 Further, the Wilkerson court was operating under the
assumption that the Eighth Amendment must be interpreted in a
strictly historical manner-that since the firing squad was accepted at
the time of the Amendment's adoption in 1791, it would remain con-
stitutional forever. This view of the Amendment was repudiated in
the landmark case of Weems v. United States.' Consequently, Wilker-
son's viability is suspect.4 9
Wilkerson does stress, however, that torture would be impermissi-
ble,50 and the Court lists punishments which would violate the Eighth
Amendment: dragging to the place of execution, disembowelment, be-
heading, quartering, and burning alive.5'
Courts treat In re Kemmler5 2 as definitively legalizing the electric
chair.53 In Kemmler, New York's newly passed electrocution statute
46. Id. at 134-35.
47. Had the statute prescribed the mode of executing the sentence, it would have
been the duty of the court to follow it, unless the punishment to be inflicted [i.e.
shooting] was cruel and unusual, within the meaning of the eighth amendment to
the Constitution, which is not pretended by the counsel of the prisoner.
Id at 136-37 (emphasis added).
48. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See the discussion of Weems, infra notes 59-64 and accompa-
nying text.
49. But cf infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the gas cham-
ber under a pre-Weems historical standard, see infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text;
infra note 233.
50. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36.
51. Id. at 135.
52. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
53. Kemmler has been cited for this proposition in countless cases, one of the earliest
being Ferguson v. State, 105 So. 840 (Fla. 1925), affd per curiam, 273 U.S. 663 (1926). For
lists of such cases, see Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1081 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
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was challenged by William Kemmler, the first inmate scheduled to die
by this new method. 4 The Supreme Court did find the procedure
constitutional, but under a quite different set of circumstances than
exist today.
First, since in 1890 the Supreme Court had not yet incorporated
the Eighth Amendment guarantee against "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment did
not apply to the case.' Rather, the Supreme Court decided Kemmler
under a pure Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process analy-
sis, asking only whether the New York Legislature had violated due
process in adopting the electric chair. The Court concluded that the
Legislature's hearings and debates on the subject were sufficient to
ensure that due process had attended the adoption of the electric
chair.56 As a result, the Court's statement that the electric chair
would not violate the Eighth Amendment was dicta.5 7 Further, Kem-
mler was based, like Wilkerson, on the now-defunct historical inter-
pretation of the Eighth Ameldment.5 8
The Supreme Court abandoned the purely historical view of the
Eighth Amendment, under which Wilkerson and Kemmler were de-
cided, in Weems. Weems, a Coast Guard official working in the Phil-
ippines, then a U.S. territory, was found guilty of making a false entry
in a payroll book and sentenced to cadena temporal, a punishment
originating in Spanish law. Cadena temporal consisted of (1) twelve to
twenty years (fifteen in this case) of imprisonment at hard labor with a
chain attached to the wrist and ankle at all times; (2) deprivation of all
parental, marital, and property rights while imprisoned; (3) the per-
manent obligation, after release, to keep the authorities apprised of
his whereabouts, and not to change his place of residence without offi-
cial permission; (4) permanent deprivation of the right to vote, hold
office, or collect his government pension; and (5) a fine between 1,250
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1040 n.9; Nugent, supra
note 19, at 192 n.71. For a detailed analysis of how courts have used Kemmler in denying
challenges to various methods of execution, see Denno, supra note 19, at 616-23.
Kemmler's viability has been undercut even further by Justice Souter's comment that
"the holding of [Kemmler] does not constitute a dispositive response to litigation of the
issue in light of modem knowledge about the method of execution in question." Poyner v.
Murray, 113 S. Ct. 2397,2399 (1993) (Souter, J., with Stevens and Blackmun, JJ., respecting
denial of certiorari).
54. For the history of the Kemmler execution, see TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 17-22;
Denno, supra note 19, at 566-607; Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1042-45; Nugent, supra note
19, at 190-93.
55. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-49.
56. IkL at 449.
57. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
58. Id.
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to 12,500 pesetas (4,000 in this case)., 9
After pointing out that "[s]uch penalties amaze those who...
believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to offense [sic]", 60 the Court questions
whether a punishment could be "cruel and unusual" by virtue of its
disproportionality to the crime. 61 Rejecting the purely historical view
of the Eighth Amendment, 62 the Weems Court holds that the Eighth
Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire mean-
ing as public opinion becomes, enlightened by a humane justice." 63
The Court concludes by finding the provisions of cadena temporal, be-
yond the prison term, unconstitutionally cruel in light of the crime
committed because the Eighth Amendment bars punishments dispro-
portionate to the offense. 64
Since Weems, most of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
cases have dealt with proportionality rather than per se constitutional-
ity-that is examining a punishment in the context of the individual
case rather than in all possible cases.6' Trop v. Dulles66 is a rare ex-
ception, and it remains the only U.S. Supreme Court decision finding
a particular type of punishment-expatriation-per se violative of the
Eighth Amendment.67
59. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364-65.
60. Id. at 366-67.
61. Il at 371.
62. [A] principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mis-
chief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.... In the applica-
tion of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has
been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as
easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general prin-
ciples would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and
lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.
Id. at 373.
63. Id. at 378. In an oft-quoted passage, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality
in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), restated this critical holding:
The Court recognized in [Weems] that the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are
not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-101 (Burger, C.J., writing for a four-justice plurality) (footnote
omitted).
64. Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81.
65. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); but see infra note 223.
66. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
67. Lower federal courts have found some punishments illegal under any circum-
stances. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d. 571, 579-81 (8th Cir. 1968) (whippings with a
strap); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971) (shackling for punitive
purposes); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546) (cutting off
the hair of Chinese immigrants who wear long hair for religious and/or cultural reasons).
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Trop involved a soldier, a native-born American, convicted of de-
sertion by court-martial during World War II. He was sentenced to
three years at hard labor and dishonorably discharged. When Trop
applied for a passport in 1952, he discovered that under § 401(g) of
the Nationality Act of 194068 his citizenship had been revoked pursu-
ant to his desertion conviction. The Court reversed the penalty, find-
ing, inter alia, that expatriation as punishment for a crime is "cruel and
unusual" under any circumstances.69
Trop is not terribly useful, however, as a tool for deciding what
other punishments might violate the Eighth Amendment. Although
the four-justice plurality opinion deals largely with the Amendment,70
Chief Justice Burger states early in the opinion that expatriation sim-
ply "is not subject to the general powers of the National Government
and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers"71
and that "[o]n this ground alone the judgement in this case should be
reversed."72 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,"3 which provides
the decisive vote, focuses only on the extent of Congress' war-making
power, concluding that expatriation is beyond the scope of that
power.74 Thus, the entirety of the plurality's Eighth Amendment dis-
cussion, although widely cited, may be considered dicta.75
Nonetheless, Trop is widely cited for the notion that "[t]he basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man."76 This principle is quite broad, however, and there
have been few attempts to define more precisely the meaning of the
phrase "the dignity of man. 77
The Ho Ah Kow court's statement was actually dicta, however, since the court had first
held that the regulation was violative of Due Process as beyond the power of the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors to implement (see id& at 253-54) and then added that the
regulation violated equal protection because although facially applicable to everyone, it
was known to be directed at Chinese immigrants (see id. at 254-55). These appear to be the
only decisions addressing the issue.
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8), 54 Stat. 1168, 1169 (1940).
69. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-03.
70. Id. at 99-104.
71. Itt at 92.
72. Id. at 93.
73. Id. at 105-14.
74. lId at 114.
75. See Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981) (refer-
ring to Trop's "dignity of man" language, see infra note 76, as dicta).
76. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; see, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 392 (1989)
(Brennan, J., with Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); McClesky v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279,300 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.,
with Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
77. Compare infra notes 148-75 and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis of
every Supreme Court usage of the term "human dignity" and related terms (including
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Courts also treat the more recent Fifth Circuit case of Gray v.
Lucas7 as upholding the constitutionality of the gas chamber.79 The
actual holding in Gray was quite equivocal, 80 however, and even then
was based on the historical understanding of the Eighth Amendment
explicitly abandoned in Weems, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his
dissent from the denial of certiorari.81
Hi. Consequences of the Lack of Standards
Without any clear standards to govern their actions, state officials
have little guidance as to how to carry out executions. Courts, more-
over, have no way of deciding whether a particular execution was car-
ried out in a "cruel and unusual" manner, much less what the odds are
that future executions will be "cruel and unusual." In the face of om-
nipresent budgetary concerns, officials have little incentive to review
and update execution procedures as psychological and physiological
"dignity of man"), see Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Juris-
prudentially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 150-84 (1984).
78. 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
79. In disposing of the question of the constitutionality of the gas chamber without any
apparent reasoning of its own, Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1984) cites a string of
cases, among which only Gray actually mentions the issue. Similarly, State v. Williams, 800
P.2d 1240, 1250 (Ariz. 1987) and Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45, 70 (Md. 1983) uphold the
constitutionality of the gas chamber by simply quoting Gray without further analysis.
80. The holding, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Although contemporary notions of civilized conduct may indeed cause some
reassessment of what degree or length is acceptable, we are not persuaded that
under the present jurisprudential standards the showing made by Gray justifies
this intermediate appellate court holding that, as a matter of law or fact, the pain
and terror resulting from death by cyanide gas is so different in degree or nature
from that resulting from other traditional modes of execution as to implicate the
eighth amendment [sic] right.
Gray, 710 F.2d at 1061 (emphasis added).
Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari, cleverly edits
the holding to make it sound less provisional:
I agree with the Court of Appeals that the showing made by petitioner does notjustify a court holding "that, as a matter of law or fact, the pain and terror result-
ing from death by cyanide is so different in degree or nature from that resulting
from other traditional modes of execution as to implicate the eighth amendment
[sic] right."
Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1239-40 (1983) (emphasis added). No other Justices joined
this opinion.
81.
First, "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death."
[Kemmler]. Second, punishments are cruel when they "involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain." [Gregg] .... The Court of Appeals [in the opinion
below] failed to apply either of the foregoing principles to the case before it....
Had the court made an effort to apply the proper legal standards, it seems highly
likely that it would have found the lethal-gas method to be unconstitutional.
Id., 463 U.S. at 1244-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Spring 19951 IS THE GAS CHAMBER "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL?" 831
knowledge increases, or even to maintain death chamber equipment
properly.82 Besides the obvious pain and horrific degradation that
many condemned prisoners suffer in their final moments of life,83 the
tacit judicial acceptance of this cruelty fosters an unhealthy and poten-
tially dangerous atmosphere of indifference to human suffering by
prison officials and law enforcement.'
The lack of meaningful judicial review perpetuates itself, since
the issue tends to arise only in the context of an impending execution.
At that point there is great pressure on the court to allow the execu-
tion; then the complex procedural bars85 to eleventh-hour successor
habeas corpus petitions make it easy for courts to avoid the merits of
the constitutional issue.
IV. Why the Gas Chamber is Peculiarly Suited to Judicial
Scrutiny
The gas chamber8 6 is perhaps the best suited for appellate review
of any current method of execution. The course of death is similar in
82. See e.g., Denno, supra note 19, at 683 n.903 ("the only experienced hangman
known lives in the backwoods of Canada and 'has not responded to notes left on a tree
stump for him by the local authorities"' (quoting Michael D. Hinds, Making Execution
Humane (Or Can It Be?), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1990, at 8)); see also supra note 39; infra
note 102.
83. See infra notes 87, 88, 90-92, 94-97, 100-01, 172, 193, 199, and 236.
84. Ironically, the recent judicial attention to methods of execution may have caused
even more official neglect. When the bill adding lethal injection at the prisoner's option
was introduced in the California Senate, the Attorney General's office specifically discour-
aged the Senate from adopting any regulations to guide the lethal injection process, since
such regulations would only leave the process more vulnerable to legal challenges. See
STAFF OF CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 1991-92 REGULAR SESSION, DEATH
PENALTY-EXECUTION By LETHAL INJEcrION OR LETHAL GAS, at 5-6 (Comm. Print
1992) (on file with author).
85. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 341 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
Teague plurality adopted for no adequate reason a novel threshold test for federal review
of state criminal convictions that, subject to narrow exceptions, precludes federal courts
from considering a vast array of important federal questions on collateral review."); Marc
M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane,
69 N.C. L. REv. 371,407-10 (1991) (federal habeas claimant must show novelty of claim to
overcome procedural default for failure to raise in state habeas petition, but novelty, if
proved, bars federal relief; Robert Alton Harris' claim of lack of competent psychiatric
assistance under Ake v. Oklahoma used as example); Kit Kimports, Habeas Corpus, Quali-
fied Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L.
REv. 115, 122-30 (1991) (necessity, and difficulty, of proving novelty of claim); Sevilla &
Laurence, supra note 9, at 348 (describing habeas barriers as "procedural quicksand"); see
generally Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L... 941 (1991).
86. Ten prisoners have been gassed in America since 1976. DEATH PENALTY INFOR-
MATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (Jan. 26, 1995).
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all cases,87 and whatever pain and indignity occurs results from the
predictable action of the gas itself, and not from any sort of unforesee-
able mishaps.
By contrast, the historically favored method, hanging, has long
been thought virtually instantaneous if the prisoner's weight and neck-
muscle strength are properly assessed when selecting the rope length,
so that the spinal cord is instantly severed at the end of the drop.88
87. The sequence of physical symptoms is always the same. Breathing in cyanide
gas paralyzes the heart and lungs. The victim becomes giddy. Panic gives way to
a severe headache, followed by chest pains. Respiration becomes impossible, so
that the victim struggles vainly for breath, eyes popping, tongue hanging thick and
swollen from a drooling mouth. His face turns purple.
TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 12.
Execution by cyanide gas is "in essence asphyxiation by suffocation or strangula-
tion." As dozens of uncontroverted expert statements filed in this case illustrate,
execution by cyanide gas is extremely and unnecessarily painful.
"Following inhalation of cyanide gas, a person will first experience hypoxia, a
condition defined as a lack of oxygen in the body. The hypoxic state can continue
for several minutes after the cyanide gas is released in the execution chamber.
During this time, a person will remain conscious and immediately may suffer ex-
treme pain throughout his arms, shoulders, back, and chest. The sensation may
be similar to pain felt by a person during a massive heart attack."
"Execution by gas. . . produces prolonged seizures, incontinence of stool
and urine, salivation, vomiting, wretching, ballistic writhing, flailing, twitching of
extremities, [and] grimacing." This suffering lasts for 8 to 10 minutes, or longer.
Eyewitness descriptions of executions by cyanide gas lend depth to these
clinical accounts. On April 6, 1992, Arizona executed Don Eugene Harding.
"When the fumes enveloped Don's head he took a quick breath. A few seconds
later he again looked in my direction. His face was red and contorted as if he
were attempting to fight through tremendous pain. His mouth was pursed shut
and his jaw was clenched tight. Don then took several more quick gulps of the
fumes."
"At this point Don's body started convulsing violently.... His face and body
turned a deep red and the veins in his temple and neck began to bulge until I
thought they might explode."
"After about a minute Don's face leaned partially forward, but he was still
conscious. Every few seconds he continued to gulp in. He was shuddering uncon-
trollably and his body was racked with spasms. His head continued to snap back.
His hands were clenched."
"After several more minutes, the most violent of the convulsions subsided.
At this time the muscles along Don's left arm and back began twitching in a
wavelike motion under his skin. Spittle drooled from his mouth."
"Don did not stop moving for approximately eight minutes, and after that he
continued to twitch and jerk for another minute. Approximately two minutes
later, we were told by a prison official that the execution was complete."
"Don Harding took ten minutes and thirty. one seconds to die."
Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1654 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Exhibits in Support of Motion for Tem-
porary Restraining Order). Similar evidence is described at length in Gray v. Lucas, 463
U.S. 1237, 1241-44 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), as well as in
Fierro, see infra notes 130-31, 193, and text accompanying each.
88. See, e.g., JoHN LAURENCE, A HIsToRY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 48 (1960). How-
ever, a recent study of the exhumed skeletons of thirty-four English prisoners hanged in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveals that the so-called "hangman's
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Even in nineteenth-century England, however, when professional and
experienced hangmen followed carefully calculated tables and con-
ducted hangings regularly,89 it was not uncommon for the executioner
to select either too short a rope, in which case the neck failed to snap
and the prisoner slowly died of strangulation, or too long a rope, in
which case the prisoner was decapitated. 90 Similar accidents have oc-
curred in American hangings as well,91 Further, it is unclear whether
a proper hanging ever causes quick unconsciousness. 92
The other historical method still in use, the firing squad,93 also
fracture," a fracture of the second or third vertebra which causes quick unconsciousness,
occurred in only 19% of the hangings. Ryk James & Rachel Nasmyth-Jones, The Occur-
rence of Cervical Fractures in Victims of Judicial Hanging, 54 FORENSIC ScI. INT'L 81, 90
(1992). The study concluded that 48% of the prisoners died not of a broken neck, but
wholly or in part by strangulation. Id. at 83-86, 90. Further, there was no correlation found
between the length of drop and the likelihood of a fracture; nor did the more experienced
hangmen have significantly greater success at causing fractures. Id. at 86-87.
In fact, the expression "pulling one's leg" may have come from the practice of having
assistant executioners stationed under the gallows to pull the prisoners legs if the drop
failed to instantly kill him, thus giving the appearance of a perfect hanging. GEORGE V.
BISHOP, EXECUrIONs: THE LEGAL WAYS OF DEATH 109 (1965).
89. See LAURENCE, supra note 88, at 49-50 (1960); CHARLES DuFF, A HANDBOOK ON
HANGING 192 (1974) (example of a nineteenth century chart matching rope length to pris-
oner's weight); Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("The British histori-
cally sought to utilize an energy level of 1260 foot-pounds [applied to the neck by the rope]
during each judicial hanging.").
90. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 715-16; DUFF, supra note 89, at 106 (partial decapitation
of Patrick Haret); LAURENCE, supra note 88, at 49 (accidental decapitation of Robert
Goodale).
91. See State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 935-36 (Wash. 1981) (describing various
lengthy strangulations and partial decapitations resulting from botched'hangings); Martin
R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities-An Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of
Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 119-21 (1978); Ken Driggs, A Current of
Electricity Sufficient in Intensity to Cause Immediate Death. A Pre-Furman History of Flor-
ida's Electric Chair, 22 STETSON L. REv. 1169, 1175-76 n.29 (1993) (quoting Had a Hard
Time in Hanging Negro, FLA. TIrMES-UNION, July 10, 1909, at 1 (botched hanging ending in
15 minute strangulation) and Dies on Gallows, FLA. TIMES-UNIoN, Apr. 8, 1902, at 5 (14
minute strangulation)); Ecenbarger, supra note 19, at 10 (botched Washington hangings
included suffocating prisoners begging to be dropped a second time); id. (Illinois prisoner
in 1896 strangled slowly for 45 minutes); id. (decapitation of Eva Dugan in 1930 Arizona
hanging). For one court's extensive factual findings regarding the risk of decapitation, see
infra note 121.
92. See Frampton, 627 P.2d at 934-35 (hanging does not usually sever the spinal cord,
and consciousness may persist even when the spinal cord is severed).
93. Utah is the sole state still using the firing squad, albeit only at the election of the
condemned inmate. Otherwise, the default method is lethal injection. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1994). Utah's unique use of this method apparently derives from the
Mormon doctrine of blood atonement, the belief that a murderer can only be cleansed of
her sin by physically spilling her blood on the ground during the execution process. See
Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation as a Sufficient Condition for Unconstitu-
tionality Under the Establishment Clause-A Case for Consideration: The Utah Firing
Squad, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 440 & n.18. For a description of the Utah firing squad
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has problems. Death is rarely instantaneous, and it is doubtless quite
painful to have a fist-sized hole punched in one's chest.94 Further,
mishaps can occur regarding the aim and intentions of the
executioners.95
Electrocution is even more unpredictable, with many varieties of
mishaps.96 Although electricity has the power to kill instantane-
ously,97 it is quite difficult to get it to do so predictably.
The execution procedures currently in use usually call for one or
two long, high-voltage jolts, followed by a series of lower voltage jolts
procedure, see Jacob Weisberg, This Is Your Death, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991, at
23, 24.
Although Idaho uses lethal injection as its sole method, state law allows for use of the
firing squad should lethal injection become "impractical." IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (1994).
Similarly, Oklahoma uses only lethal injection, but specifies electrocution as a second
choice if lethal injection is ever declared unconstitutional; the firing squad is listed as the
third choice. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014 (West 1995).
Gary Gilmore, the first person executed after the 1976 reinstatement of the death
penalty, died by firing squad in Utah in 1977. Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Under-
standing the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413,413-
14 (1992). Interestingly, Gilmore may have committed murder primarily because of a self-
destructive impulse, and may have chosen to commit his crimes in Utah because of the
availability of blood atonement through the firing squad. White, supra note 19, at 873-74;
cf. infra note 196.
In any case, no one in this country has faced the firing squad since. See DEATH PEN-
ALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (Jan. 26, 1995).
94. See TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 11 ("Looking at the information he'd gathered
on execution by shooting, Fred [Leuchter, formerly America's foremost designer and
builder of execution equipment] concluded that it was a painful way to die .... '[I]f I shoot
you, I know you hurt."'); but see Denno, supra note 19, at 688-89 (suggesting that shooting,
competently conducted, may actually be less cruel than either hanging or electrocution).
95. Elisio Mares, an inmate popular with the staff at Utah's death row prison, was
executed on September 10, 1951. TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 11. Since none of the five
riflemen wanted to be the one to fire the fatal shot, each aimed at the right side of his chest
rather than at the heart. Id. Consequently, "[tihe firing squad and witnesses watched in
horror as Mares bled slowly to death." Id. Interestingly, at least one commentator attrib-
utes the Mares incident to deliberate cruelty and desire for vengeance on the part of the
riflemen. See Denno, supra note 19, at 689.
96. See TROMBLEY, supra note 19 at 44-51, 59-60 (describing Florida's botched 1990
execution of Jesse Tafero, which took 13 minutes and involved flames shooting out of
Tafero's head); Denno, supra note 19, at 554-56 (same); id. at 598-602 (describing the grue-
some execution of William Kemmler, the first inmate to die in the electric chair). For
descriptions of eleven botched electrocutions between 1979 and 1992, see id. at 664-74.
97. See TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 34 (quoting FRED A. LEUCHTER, FRED A.
LEUCHTER AssOcIATEs MODULAR ELECTROCUTION SYSTEM SPECIFICATION MANUAL)
("Generally [when Leuchter's state-of-the-art equipment is used] unconsciousness occurs
in 4.16 milliseconds, which is 1/240 part of a second. This is twenty-four (24) times as fast
as the subject's conscious nervous system can record pain."). But see Denno, supra note
19, at 637-43 (listing evidence suggesting that electrocution is never instantaneous and is
always painful); Nugent, supra note 27, at 198 ("'[L]arge electrical shocks have never been
shown to induce anaesthesia, before unconsciousness."' (quoting Affadavit of Dr. Harold
Hillman at 5, Poyner v. Murray, 113 S. Ct. 2397 (1993))).
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to finish off the prisoner.98 The problems with this approach are myr-
iad. Rarely is the heart stopped instantlyf9 If too much current is
used, the internal organs can be cooked while the prisoner is still
alive. 10° If the current is too low, the secondary jolts can actually
defibrillate the heart and revive the prisoner, thus prolonging the suf-
fering.10 1 Apart from selecting the proper settings for the apparatus,
there are problems with the method's reliability. The equipment must
deliver a huge amount of electricity and is tested, much less used,
rarely. 0 12 Also, the electrical contacts, if improperly set up, can mis-
direct the current and simply burn the flesh without sufficiently dis-
rupting heart or brain function.10 3
The relatively predictable course of death in the gas chamber,
then, gives courts a consistent body of scientific evidence to rely upon,
obviating the need to speculate about what will occur in a particular
future execution.
V. How Have Lower Courts Defined "Cruel and Unusual"?
A. Campbell v. Wood and Fierro v. Gomez
In Campbell, the majority upholds the constitutionality of hang-
ing, and in doing so sets out its version of the Eighth Amendment test
for methods of execution.1°4 The decision followed a limited remand
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing solely on the cruelty of
hanging, and the district court's rulings following that hearing laid the
groundwork for the Campbell decision.
In evaluating Washington State's hanging procedure and how
much pain it potentially inflicts, the district court in Campbell refused
to accept any evidence about past hangings not carried out under the
98. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1055. In the 1960's, New York State executioners va-
ried the technique by repeatedly raising and lowering the voltage over the course of two
minutes. Denno, supra note 19, at 630-31.
99. Denno, supra note 19, at 639-43; Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1055-56.
100. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1088 (1985) (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (prisoner's liver too hot to touch during autopsy);
ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS Ill
(1990) (internal organs sometimes explode during electrocution).
101. See Denno, supra note 19, at 633-64.
102. See Buenano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309, 313-14 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting)
(noting Florida's test for determining cause of botch of Jesse Tafero electrocution consisted
of putting a sponge in a household toaster to determine the effect of electric current pass-
ing through it, despite the obvious fact that heat and electricity are different phenomena);
Denno, supra note 19, at 652-54 (stating Florida officials test electric chair using a test
dummy with a colander for a head, a rubber tub of saline solution for a body, and a pipe
for a leg, explaining that "we are all bags full of liquid").
103. See Denno, supra note 19, at 637-38, 644-45, and 664-68.
104. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 681-87.
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"Washington protocol";105 a series of instructions dictating the rope's
treatment, length, thickness, and placement of the knot.0 6 Thus,
although hangings had been going on for centuries, some apparently
satisfying the requirements of the Washington protocol, 0 7 the district
court would consider evidence relating to only one previous hanging,
that of Westley Allan Dodd on January 5, 1993,108 According to the
state's witnesses, the only ones permitted to witness the execution and
view the autopsy results, 09 Dodd lost consciousness in seconds and
was dead within two minutes with a minimum of pain.
Even more strangely, the district court similarly refused to admit
evidence on the relative amount of pain inflicted by alternative meth-
ods of execution, such as lethal injection, on relevance grounds.110 On
the basis of this truncated evidentiary record, the district court con-
cluded as a factual matter that there was little risk of unnecessary
pain, asphyxiation, or decapitation under Washington's procedure."'
The Campbell court's Eighth Amendment analysis begins by ask-
ing whether hanging is either (1) "considered cruel and unusual at the
time that the Bill of Rights was adopted,""' 2 or (2) is now "contrary to
'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society,""' 3 intimating that either one would render it invalid.
The court disposes of the first question quickly, saying that "[t]here is
no dispute that execution by hanging was acceptable when the Bill of
Rights was adopted.""' 4
The court acknowledges that under recent Supreme Court prece-
dent, the actions of the various state legislatures are a strong factor in
determining the nation's evolving standards of decency in most Eighth
Amendment cases. 115 However, the court discounts the importance of
the states' nearly unanimous abandonment of hanging, 1 6 claiming
105. Id at 685-87.
106. These instructions, also known as Field Instruction WSP 410.500, were taken ver-
batim from U.S. ARMY REGULATION No. 633-15, PROCEDURE FOR MILITARY EXECU-
TIONS (1959). Campbell, 18 F.3d at 683. Interestingly, no hanging was ever carried out by
the military during the time these regulations were in force, so the validity of its recom-
mendations was never tested. Id at 712 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 722 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (discussing similarities between current
procedures and those used in the botched execution of Black Jack Ketchum in 1901).
108. It at 685.
109. lIt at 723-24 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
110. lIt at 686-87.
111. Id at 687.
112. Idt at 681 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (quoting, in
turn, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))).
113. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
114. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682.
115. Id (citing Stanford v. Kentucky and McClesky v. Kemp).
116. Of the 48 states which have used hanging at one time or another, 39 have changed
to another method of execution and seven have abandoned the death penalty altogether.
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that such considerations are not as compelling when the courts review
"methodology" (i.e. the method of execution)." 7 Rather, when as-
sessing the constitutionality of a method of execution, courts should
look "more heavily" at whether a method is "free... of 'the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain."' 11 8
The court's distinction between proportionality review and
"methodology" review, including the assertion that pain is the most
important factor in the latter, has no basis in prior law.119 Even so,
the court, armed with its new Eighth Amendment test and with the
district court's findings of fact, had little trouble concluding that hang-
ing comports with the Eighth Amendment. 2 °
Interestingly, the court offhandedly mentions the risk of decapita-
tion as a factor in its decision' 2 ' without explaining why it bothers to
Campbell, 18 F.3d at 697, 726-29 (Reinhardt, I., dissenting). Washington is the only state
currently carrying out hangings, having performed two in the past two years. See id. at 685
(Westley Allan Dodd hanged on January 5, 1993); Around the Nation: Struggle at Execu-
tion, WASH. PosT, May 28, 1994, at A9 (Charles Rodman Campbell hanged on May 27,
1994). Those have been the only two American hangings since the 1976 reinstatement of
the death penalty. See DmTH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACrs ABOUT THE
DEATH PENALTY 1 (Jan. 26, 1995).
Montana, which officially retains hanging, carried out its last execution in 1943, Camp-
bell, 18 F.3d at 727 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), and (like Washington) offers condemned
inmates the alternative of lethal injection. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) (1993). New
Hampshire designates lethal injection as its method of execution, but retains hanging as an
alternate possibility if lethal injection should become "impractical." N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5 (XII)-(XIV) (1993). Similarly, Delaware specifies hanging as the default
method if lethal injection is ever declared unconstitutional. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(f) (1994).
117. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682.
118. Id. at 683.
119. "No other court has ever recognized 'methodology review' as a separate category
of Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed, until today this term has never appeared in a
judicial opinion discussing that Amendment-it did not even appear in the Justice Brennan
dissent the majority quotes." Id. at 705 n.23 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. The Campbell court's concession that decapitation violates the Eighth Amend-
ment has already resulted in a bizarre and fascinating lower court decision. In Rupe v.
Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Wash 1994), Michael Rupe, a death row inmate standing 6
feet and one-quarter inches, and weighing 409 and one-quarter pounds, challenged the
Washington hanging protocol as applied in his case. He claimed that he was at great risk of
decapitation owing to his weight, which was nearly 200 pounds above the maximum weight
accounted for in the Washington hanging tables.
After reviewing the extensive evidence regarding the amount of force a hanging rope
exerts on the human neck, the spine and neck muscles' ability to absorb shock, and a host
of similar concerns, the Rupe court finds that under the Washington hanging procedure,
Rupe's neck would be subject to a force 24% to 40% higher than that applied to Charles
Rodman Campbell's neck. Rupe, 863 F. Supp. at 1313. The court adds that the result is an
increase in the risk of decapitation, although any further shortening of the rope would
increase the risk of slow strangulation. Id. After mentioning that there might be some
optimal rope length which would minimize both risks, the court concludes that the state
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do so. This seems anomalous since according to the court's reasoning
only the amount of pain inflicted matters.122 Decapitation inflicts no
additional pain, and indeed may prevent pain by making unconscious-
ness instantaneous. 23 Indeed, taking the Campbell court's logic seri-
ously, one might find deliberate decapitation, such as by the guillotine,
preferable to hanging.
In upholding the exclusion of evidence on alternative methods of
execution, the Campbell court finds the relative cruelty of lethal injec-
tion irrelevant to the question of whether Washington's hanging
method inflicts unnecessary pain.124 The majority's test would allow
any particular method as long as it is carried out as painlessly as possi-
ble, without regard to other methods; an extremely narrow inquiry.
125
In Fierro, Judge Patel's factual findings and evidentiary rulings
regarding death by cyanide gas are far more damning than were the
Campbell district court's findings regarding hanging. Because execu-
tion procedures at San Quentin have changed little since the gas
chamber's introduction in 1937,126 evidence from all executions held
there were found relevant and admitted at trial.' 27
has not adequately investigated the mechanics of hanging so as to arrive at an acceptable
rope length, concluding that "[i]t is not for the Court to devise an appropriate protocol for
hanging Mr. Rupe; that task belonged to the State." /L
The court goes on to distinguish Campbell, noting that there had been little risk of
decapitating Campbell, while the Risk to Rupe is significantly higher. "Thus, the risk of
decapitation cannot be dismissed as a 'possible error' or 'accident."' Id at 1314.
Interestingly, the district judge in Rupe explicitly states what the Campbell court only
hinted at: that decapitation violates the Eighth Amendment irrespective of how much pain
it causes, and that other painless mutilations, even postmortem, might be "cruel and unu-
sual." Rupe, 863 F. Supp. at 1314-15.
122. See id at 703 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 705 ("[T]he guillotine is a comparatively painless method of execution.");
but cf BISHOP, supra note 88, at 40-45 (describing French experiment in 1905 showing that
guillotined heads remain conscious for a "substantial" period of time).
124. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 687.
125. This makes little sense, since it is unclear what the "unnecessary cruelty" could
mean without anything to compare the cruelty to. See Id, at 694 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
("It is logically impossible to consider whether the risks inherent in hanging are necessary
without considering whether alternative methods of execution ... obviate those risks"); see
also id at 716 & n.43.
One commentator does defend the Campbell court's reasoning on this point, although
the argument can only be characterized as inept and wholly unconvincing. See Gary E.
Hood, Note, Campbell v. Wood: The Death Penalty in Washington State: "Hanging" Onto a
Method of Execution, 30 GONZ. L. REv. 163, 179 (1994/95).
126. "The execution procedures were developed in the early 1980s by Warden Vasquez
and his staff. In developing the procedures, Vasquez drew on the procedures that had been
used for lethal gas executions at San Quentin from 1937 to 1967." Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F.
Supp. 1387, 1391 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
127. See id at 1400-01 & n.11.
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Further, while the Campbell court attributed whatever pain that
might result from hanging to unforeseeable mishaps, the course of
death in the gas chamber is uniform and predictable,' 28 making avail-
able more and better scientific literature and opinion. 2 As Judge
Patel's extensive factual findings in Fierro show, generally accepted
medical teachings130 regarding cyanide conclude that death by cyanide
is quite painful, lasting several minutes and involving suffocation at
the cellular level, intense buildup of lactic acid in the muscles (includ-
ing the heart), and tetany, spasms of the muscles so intense that the
surrounding bones sometimes break.' 3 '
The factual findings by both the Campbell and Fierro courts are
similar in one regard: both district courts found unmistakable legisla-
tive trends against the use of the method in question.' 32
In deciding the case, Judge Patel wrote a first opinion interpreting
and applying Campbell, a daunting task. The Judge is quite open
about the fact that she has trouble understanding Campbell.'33 Fierro
lists Campbell's many ambiguities and contradictions, and makes a
valiant attempt to reconcile the decision with prior Eighth Amend-
ment precedent.' 34 Nonetheless, the Fierro test for "cruel and unusu-
alness" bears little resemblance to Campbell.35
The Fierro test says, simply enough, that when examining a
method of execution under Campbell, a court must determine
whether the method meets "evolving standards of decency," using pri-
marily "objective evidence of pain" to determine whether the method
is constitutional. 36 If, however, the evidence of pain is unclear or
contradictory, the court then considers legislative trends as evidence
128. See supra note 87.
129. See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1413 n.32 (noting how much more "extraordinarily de-
tailed and comprehensive" the record in Fierro is compared to the record in Campbell).
130. See id. at 1398 ("Plaintiff's theory of death through cellular suffocation has tradi-
tionally been the accepted viewpoint."); id. at 1404 ("Dr. Baskin [the primary defense ex-
pert] even conceded that medical schools currently teach [the cytochrome oxidase primacy
theory, upon which plaintiffs rely].").
131. See idt at 1396-97, 1404.
132. See id. at 1414-15; supra note 117.
133. See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1409 ("It is difficult at times to decipher the Campbell
opinion. This court nonetheless must attempt to do so .... ").
Judge Patel is not alone. The first commentator to address Campbell attempts to de-
fend it with logic even more obscure than that of the Campbell opinion itself. See Hood,
supra note 125, at 175-81.
134. [T]his court does not read Campbell as a sub silentio overruling of well-estab-
lished precedent in this area, see, e.g., [Trop v. Dulles], or as an "[e]visceration of
the Eighth Amendment," as did the dissenters in Campbell.
Id. at 1412.
135. In fact, Fierro resembles the basic framework of the Campbell dissent as much as it
does the majority opinion. See infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
136. Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1412.
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of "evolving standards of decency."' 37
Fierro's factual findings paint a grim portrait of death in the gas
chamber. Fierro adds, however, that such suffering is not plainly un-
constitutional under the Campbell standard.3 8 Moving to the second
part of the analysis, Fierro finds the widespread abandonment of the
gas chamber dispositive.' 39 The Campbell court presumably reached a
different result because it never had to address the second question.
Although the test is quite straightforward and seems to be a rea-
sonable clarification of Campbell, Judge Patel supplies no historical or
doctrinal underpinnings for the test. Indeed, she is in no position to
do so, since the Campbell opinion gives no hint of the test's basis in
prior law.
Following Campbell, Fierro makes no effort to compare the gas
chamber to other methods of execution, except to note the national
legislative trend toward using lethal injection; a trend based primarily,
the opinion concludes, on humanitarian concerns. 4 ° It would have
been surprising if Judge Patel had compared the two methods, since
Campbell explicitly found comparison between methods irrelevant.
B. Other Decisions
In the few other federal cases purporting to address the issue, the
opinions have disposed of the question without adequately explaining
the reasoning involved.' 4' The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Gray v. Lu-
137. Id
138. Id. at 1414.
139. Id. at 1415.
140. See id. at 1407-08; see also JAMES W. MARQUET ET AL., TIE ROPE, THE CHAIR
AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 132 ("The [Texas] legisla-
tive rationale for changing the means of execution resided in the belief that lethal injec-
tions were more humane than the physically traumatic and visually offensive
electrocution."). But see Gardner, supra note 91, at 96 n.4, 128 n.241 (Oklahoma's switch
to lethal injection, one of the first such decisions, was based primarily on economic con-
cerns (citing OKLA. J., Mar. 3, 1977, § 1, at 2)); STAFF OF CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, supra note 84, at 2 (California legislature added lethal injection as an alterna-
tive to the gas chamber specifically to undercut legal challenges to the gas chamber).
141. Most state courts have disposed of method-of-execution claims with either obscure
reasoning, see, e.g., DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d 630,638-40 (Del. 1987) (declaring hanging
constitutional with cursory analysis only after explicitly declining to decide the issue, in
effect calling its own evaluation of hanging dicta), or with an absence of any identifiable
analysis whatsoever, see, e.g., Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 464 (Miss. 1984); State v.
Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1058-59 (Mont. 1979); Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Mo.
1969); see also Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45,70 (Md. 1983) (quoting Gray v. Lucas with-
out further analysis). One state supreme court went so far as to pretend that the issue was
previously settled when in fact it was not. See State v. Adkins, 725 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tenn.
1987) (court disposes of claim against electrocution by saying that "[t]his Court's authority
over punishment for crime ends with the adjudication of constitutionality" when the court
had never decided the issue).
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cas seemed to use a historical test, comparing the gas chamber to the
traditionally accepted methods of execution, although the one-sen-
tence Gray holding seems elastic enough to allow any method at all. 42
In another brief holding, the Eastern District Court of Arkansas, in
Hill v. Lockhart, 4 3 disposed of the claim that lethal injection violates
the Eighth Amendment as follows:
Another state court disposed of a challenge to electrocution on the basis that the ap-
pellant had offered no evidence of the cruelty of electrocution, see Fleenor v. State, 514
N.E.2d 80, 89 (Ind. 1987), and then rejected the next challenge, which did include such
evidence, by simply citing the earlier decision, see Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1107
(Ind. 1992).
One court dealt extensively with the question, although without much analysis. In
State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981), the Washington Supreme Court overturned
the death penalty statute then in force on grounds unrelated to the Eighth Amendment.
Id at 935-36. Justice Dolliver, who wrote the majority opinion, included a finding that
hanging was "cruel and unusual," although only one other justice (of a total of nine) ap-
proved the section of the opinion dealing with hanging. See id at 936 (Williams, J.) (hang-
ing unlawful); id. at 944 (Rosellini, J., with Dore, J.) (hanging lawful); id at 945 (Stafford,
J., with Brachtenbach, C.J., and Hicks and Dimmick, JJ.) (hanging lawful); id at 952 (Ut-
ter, J.) (hanging lawful).
Even the Frampton comparatively lengthy discussions of hanging spend little time on
Eighth Amendment analysis. In voting to ban hanging, Justice Dolliver first cites the wide-
spread abandonment of hanging as evidence that it is no longer compatible with "contem-
porary standards of decency." Id at 934. Dolliver then reviews the testimony of medical
experts and lists the various botched hangings in Washington history, id. at 934-36, con-
cluding that hanging is unconstitutional without saying how he is using those facts, id. at
936. Justice Williams, agreeing with Dolliver, simply adds that it is well within the ability
and duty of the courts to assess the meaning and scope of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Id at 936-38 (Williams, J., concurring specially). Williams sheds no
further light on how the task is to be accomplished in the method-of-execution context.
The reasoning of the various dissenters is even skimpier. Justice Rosellini simply says
that without a "definitive showing" that the method inflicts unnecessary cruelty (absent
here) it is up to the legislature to make such judgements. Id. at 944 (Rosellini, J., dissent-
ing in part). Justice Stafford adds that such an "emotional" issue can only be decided by
"objective criteria," rather than the "subjective standards" employed by the "majority."
Id at 945 (Stafford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ignoring the trends in
other jurisdictions, Stafford regards the Washington Legislature's actions in approving
hanging as dispositive of what contemporary standards of decency are. See id Finally,
Justice Utter, agreeing with Stafford, says only that the legislature is "better equipped" to
choose between methods of execution than are the courts. Id. at 952 (Utter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Interestingly, even though the Frampton court actually upheld hanging 7-2, all of the
seven separate opinions in Frampton refer to Justice Dolliver's minority view as the "ma-
jority." As a result, courts in other jurisdictions cite Frampton as both outlawing hanging,
see, e.g., Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966, 971 (opinion granting TRO) (N.D. Cal.), rev'd
sum nom. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 966 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), withdrawn as moot,
966 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992); Calhoun v. State, 468 A.2d 45, 70
(Md. 1983); Coleman v. State, 633 P.2d 624, 661 (Mont. 1981) (Shea, J., dissenting) and
upholding hanging, see, eg., DeShields, 534 A.2d at 640 n.9, even though the Washington
Supreme Court clarified the holding in State v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 593 (Wash. 1984).
142. See supra note 80.
143. 791 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
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There is general agreement that lethal injection is at present the
most humane type of execution available and is far preferable to
the sometimes barbaric means employed in the past. Many
states have now abandoned other forms of execution in favor of
lethal injection.1'"
Similarly, the district judge in Hunt v. Smith'45 upheld the legality
of the gas chamber with no persuasive constitutional reasoning.'46
VI. Methods of Execution and the Eighth Amendment-A
Three-Part Inquiry
Undoubtedly, one reason for the confusion is that courts treat the
constitutionality of any particular method of execution as a unitary
legal question. In fact, the issue is best understood as a three-part
inquiry.
First, one must choose the methods to be compared with each
other. Second, the methods must be ranked, from the cruelest to the
most humane. Third, one must decide what level of cruelty is permis-
sible; in other words, where to draw the line on that spectrum between
acceptable ways of killing and "cruel and unusual punishments." The
second issue is perhaps the most difficult; accordingly, it will be ad-
dressed first.
A. "Human Dignity" and the Eighth Amendment
Although the various lower court opinions mentioned above fo-
cus almost exclusively on the level of pain a method of execution in-
flicts as a determiner for the method's relative "cruelty," such an
analysis sells the Eighth Amendment short. Punishments can be
"cruel and unusual" without being painful; pain is merely one type of
cruelty.
Cruelty is more comprehensively understood as any act that di-
minishes human dignity; in fact, the Supreme Court has always recog-
nized the centrality of human dignity to the Eighth Amendment.
144. Id at 1394.
145. 856 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1994).
146. Aside from the observation that no prior cases had outlawed the gas chamber, the
Hunt court's legal analysis, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Just because there are other, newer modes of execution thought by some to be
more humane (such as lethal injection, eschewed by petitioner in this case) does
not mean that the gas chamber has become unconstitutional. Indeed, in Camp-
bell, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that hanging was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment in 1994. Certainly, the district courts are not obliged to hold plenary
proceedings to test the constitutionality of a means of execution in every case
simply because it is claimed to be outmoded or can be botched.
Hunt, 856 F. Supp. at 260.
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1. What Is Dignity?
a. Dignity in Case Law
The word "dignity" first became part of the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence when the Trop plurality declared:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man. While the state has the power to
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be ex-
ercised within the limits of civilized standards.147
Fifteen years later, Justice Brennan attempted to flesh out the
meaning of dignity in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia.'a
For Brennan, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on punishments
violative of human dignity covers punishments that are unduly painful
and degrading, 149 punishments disproportionate to the offense,' 50 and
punishments for conditions such as drug addiction or mental illness.15'
Justice Brennan emphasized these three areas as situations that "treat
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with
and discarded.' 52 He later adds: "The State, even as it punishes,
must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human
beings. A punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if it does not
comport with human dignity.' 53 Brennan concludes that the death
penalty's violation of human dignity, coupled with other factors,
makes it violative of the Eighth Amendment in all cases.' 54
Twelve years later, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Glass v. Louisiana,55 a case challenging electrocution, Brennan dis-
sented. In so doing, he made the first written attempt by a Supreme
Court Justice to articulate the factors affecting human dignity in the
execution context. Although his opinion focused primarily on the
physical pain inflicted on electrocuted prisoners, he also elaborated on
the importance of human dignity.
The Eighth Amendment's protection of "the dignity of man,"
extends beyond prohibiting the unnecessary infliction of pain
147. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
148. 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972). Furman was a per curiam 5-4 decision, with each of
the nine justices writing a separate concurring or dissenting opinion. It stands as the long-
est decision the Supreme Court has ever produced. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional
Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 323
(1986).
149. 408 U.S. at 272.
150. Id. at 274.
151. Id at 273.
152. Id. at 272-73.
153. Id. at 270.
154. Id. at 305. For a summary of Justice Brennan's view of the Eighth Amendment in
tabular form, see LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPr oF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT 16 (table 2.1) (1975).
155. 471 U.S. 1080 (1985).
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when extinguishing life. Civilized standards, for example, re-
quire a minimization of physical violence during execution irre-
spective of the pain that such violence might inflict on the
condemned. Similarly, basic notions of human dignity com-
mand that the State minimize "mutilation" and "distortion" of
the condemned prisoner's body. These principles explain the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of such barbaric practices as
drawing and quartering.
In evaluating the constitutionality of a challenged method
of capital punishment, courts must determine whether the fac-
tors discussed above-unnecessary pain, violence, and mutila-
tion-are "inherent in the method of puniihment.'
156
Brennan goes on to speculate that other forms of execution might
be more dignified than electrocution,5 7 although he never specifies
just how significantly a method of execution, in his view, may permis-
sibly infringe on the dignity of the prisoner without violating the
Eighth Amendment. 58
Brennan's opinion reiterates his belief that the death penalty vio-
lates human dignity in all circumstances, so although he speculates
that other forms of execution might be more dignified than electrocu-
tion, nowhere does he feel the need to decide just how much a method
of execution, in his view, may permissibly infringe on the dignity of
the prisoner without violating the Eighth Amendment.
In the principal dissent in Campbell,' 9 Judge Reinhardt sets out
an alternative to the majority's test of constitutionality. 60 His opinion
represents the first attempt to refine Justice Brennan's dignity analysis
into a concrete test.
Like most of the Eighth Amendment decisions, Reinhardt begins
with the familiar "evolving standards of decency" language' 61 before
going on to assert that a method of execution violates those standards
if it either (1) inflicts unnecessary pain or (2) if "the punishment has
been rejected by society as savage and barbaric." 162 Although Rein-
hardt concludes that hanging risks inflicting an unnecessarily slow and
painful death and thus violates the Eighth Amendment,' 63 he goes on
to list the different ways a judge can find that a punishment has been
156. I& at 1085 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 1094.
158. Brennan may not feel the need to make the analysis any more concrete, since he
believes that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment in all cases. See id at 1080,
1093-94.
159. 18 F.3d at 692-729 (Reinhardt, J., joined by Browning, Tang, and D.W. Nelson, JJ.,
dissenting). Judge Poole dissented separately in a one-sentence opinion. See Ud at 729.
160. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
161. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 695 (quoting Trop v. Dulles).
162. Id. at 696.
163. See id. at 711-17, 722-24.
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rejected by society.164
The best evidence of rejection, he says, is if the actions of the
state legislatures uniformly indicate rejection. This mode of analysis
for Eighth Amendment issues is set out by the Supreme Court explic-
itly in Penry v. Lynaugh,165 and according to Reinhardt it is dispositive
of the question of constitutionality in the execution context. 166
Even if the actions of the legislature were not so uniform, Rein-
hardt says, judges can ask "whether the punishment 'comports with
the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amend-
ment.' ' 167 In answering the question, he employs "the tools of philos-
ophy, religion, logic, and history" with which judges are "particularly
well-equipped, by virtue of training, education, experience, and the
characteristics that brought them to the bench.' 168 Judge Reinhardt
identifies three specific factors to consider when analyzing a method
of execution: "whether the punishment involves mutilation or dis-
memberment, whether it is historically associated with repression or
tyranny, and whether it may be fairly characterized as dehumanizing
or degrading."'169
Reinhardt concludes that hanging involves a substantial risk of
decapitation, 170 the worst kind of "mutilation or dismemberment";
that it is "associated with lynchings, with frontier justice, and with our
ugly, nasty, and best-forgotten history of bodies swinging from the
trees or exhibited in public places"; 171 and that the effects on the pris-
oner's body are impermissibly dehumanizing and degrading. 72
To sum up, the Campbell dissent finds that a method of execution
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment if:
(1) it inflicts unnecessary pain; or
2) it has been rejected by society, as evidenced by
(a) its uniform rejection by the various legislatures, or
164. Id. at 679-702.
165, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see supra note 82. See also Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (stating the
Court will not consider public opinion as expressed in opinion polls until those opinions
"find expression in legislation").
166. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 697, 700.
167. Id at 697 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,182 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
168. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 697.
169. Id
170. Id at 722.
171. Id at 701.
172.
[Lethal injection is] far less inhumane and degrading.., than the forced march of
a prisoner up the gallows steps where the untrained hangman waits in hope that
the drop will be spoiled only by the defecation and voiding that result from the
state's crude and violent effort to forcefully terminate a human life at the end of a
rope.
Id at 702-03.
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(b) its flagrant violation of human dignity (as determined
by the courts in their wisdom), including, but not lim-
ited to, any finding that
(i) it mutilates the body,
(ii) it is associated with repression or tyranny, or
(iii) it is dehumanizing or degrading.
While this attempt to come to grips with the amorphous concept
of "dignity" is admirable, and is really the first such attempt, Judge
Reinhardt's analysis remains unsatisfying. Statements advocating na-
ked judicial activism1 73 are frowned upon in the conservative, neo-
federalist climate of the current federal judiciary, and are unlikely to
be adopted by the Supreme Court;174 the dissent relies a bit too heav-
ily on judicial determinations of what "society's" viewpoint is. Here
more than ever, it is unclear how to distinguish "society's" view from
the judge's personal opinion. 75
b. Who Cares About Dignity?
The Campbell court states that in the execution context, only pain
implicates the Eighth Amendment.176 This makes sense, perhaps, if
one considers only what the condemned prisoner is feeling during her
waning moments in the death chamber. She is probably not con-
cerned with the future condition of her corpse, nor with the violence
being done her, insofar as it does not cause any additional pain. One
can surmise that the overwhelming pain she suffers leaves room for
few other concerns. 77
However, this limited view of the Eighth Amendment does not
square with the Eighth Amendment's undisputed ban on post-mortem
173. See, e.g., supra note 168.
174. See e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989) (Scalia, J., in a portion
of the Court's opinion joined by three other justices) (the opinions of "the citizenry," not
of judges, determine what evolving standards of decency are).
175. One is reminded of the dilemma Justice Marshall faced, when, after he had as-
serted in Furman that capital punishment would no longer be acceptable to fully informed
Americans, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 362-63 (Marshall, J., concurring), he was forced to
confront the fact that in response to Furman invalidating death penalty statutes then in
force, the legislatures of 35 states had immediately re-enacted the death penalty. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I would be less than
candid if I did not acknowledge that these developments have a significant bearing on a
realistic assessment of the moral acceptability of the death penalty to the American
people.").
176. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
177. Although a prisoner may in fact prefer to avoid the indignities of mutilation and of
losing control of her bodily functions, this concern probably pales in comparison to both
(1) the actual fact of her impending death and (2) the pain she will actually feel.
In fact, among suicides, who choose the manner of their own deaths, mutilation and
other indignities in death seem to matter little when compared to the priority of avoiding
pain. See, e.g., infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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punishments. 178 Clearly, the dead person whose body is quartered
feels no additional pain, mercifully. Neither does Campbell account
for the fact that beheading violates the Eighth Amendment, though it
may be the quickest and least painful of all methods. 79
Further, punishments barred by the Eighth Amendment are im-
permissible even if the defendant chooses the illegal punishment over
a legal one.'80 Indeed, such a prohibition is necessary, since otherwise
any punishment short of death, even the most sadistic tortures, would
be constitutionally permissible if offered as an alternative to death.' 8 '
Clearly, therefore, the individual prisoner is not the only person
the Eighth Amendment is protecting. As one commentator writes:
[E]ven if given the choice of punishments between torture and
death, the prisoner could not choose torture. This is true not
because the prisoner has any rights at stake, but because other
citizens have a greater right not to live under a government that
sanctions torture as one of its defining structural features.' 2
In fact, some believe that a prisoner cannot properly waive her Eighth
Amendment rights, since society's interest in preventing cruel and un-
usual punishments is so strong.'83
178. See Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125,2127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("painless, post-mortem punishments such as public display, drawing
and quartering, and mutilation also violate the Eighth Amendment"); supra note 51 and
accompanying text (quartering, a post-mortem punishment, barred by Wilkerson v. Utah).
179. See supra note 123.
180. See supra note 28.
181. This assumes, of course, that death is proportionate to the crime in question.
182. Blum, supra note 93, at 451 (footnote omitted); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The
Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
126 U. PA. L REv. 898, 1044 (1978) (public exposure heightens a violation of human dig-
nity by exacerbating the devaluation of the injured person).
183. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., with Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("I believe, however, that the consent of a convicted defendant in
a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment."); Laura A. Rosenwald, Note, Death Wish: What Washington
Courts Should Do When A Capital Defendant Wants To Die, 68 WASH. L. REV. 735, 747-52
(1993) (defendants' refusal to present mitigating evidence at sentencing phase of capital
trials violates Eighth Amendment; courts should require that a neutral party present such
evidence if defendant will not).
Some constitutional theorists consider dignity a core concern of the Constitution as a
whole, not merely of the Eighth Amendment. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Con-
stitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703, 745-54 (1980); see also G.P. Fletcher, Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 171, 178-82 (1984) (human
dignity in the Kantian sense underlies the German and U.S. constitutions); Charles Robert
Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1305-08 (1988) (identifying dignity concerns in decisions involving
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments); id. at 1303 (identifying the impor-
tant aspects of dignity protected by the Constitution as "the primacy of control over per-
sonal destiny, the inherent value of each person, and the equal worth of all individuals").
There is disagreement on this point, however, any such discussion is necessarily beyond the
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c. The Essence of Dignity
If the Eighth Amendment exists to protect human dignity, and if
human dignity is of vital societal interest, it is important to determine
exactly what human dignity encompasses. Such an inquiry must begin
with a list of what we know impinges on human dignity.
Post-mortem cruelties, including dissection and/or display of the
dead body, violate human dignity.184 So do infliction of unnecessary
pain, physical violence, and mutilation in the execution process. 8 5
What, then, do all of these have in common? Each "treat[s]
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with
and discarded.' 86 In other words, human dignity is violated when a
punishment blurs the line between human beings and objects; when
that punishment masks the things that make people different from an-
imals and objects, such as reason, emotion, and the like, and graphi-
cally reveals the raw physicality of the human body.
Dignity, therefore, is simply the expression of the idea that
human beings are unique in the universe, different from inanimate
objects and even from other animals. 87 Humans have rights and re-
sponsibilities under law, while all other creatures and things are
merely potential or actual property for humans to either use or ignore.
scope of this Note, but for a summary of the various points of view on whether dignity
concerns are inherent in the Constitution as a whole, see Tremper, supra, at 1296-303.
184. See supra note 178. For one now-famous doctor's argument in favor of conducting
experiments-including vivisection-on condemned prisoners as part of the execution pro-
cess, see generally JACK KEVORKIAN, MEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
DIALOGUE (1960).
185. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. Note that Brennan's Glass opin-
ion, while hardly binding precedent in the technical sense, was relied upon by both the
majority (in a critical passage) and by the dissent in Campbell. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at
682; id. at 705-06 & n.25, 710 n.34, 711 n.35, 715 n.40 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
186. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-73 (opinion of Brennan, J.); see also id. at 273 (opinion of
Brennan, J.) (The Trop plurality found expatriation unconstitutional because it "necessar-
ily involves a denial by society of the individual's existence as a member of the human
community.").
187. See Gardner, supra note 91, at 107 n.93 ("'Human dignity consists in our recog-
nizing that each human being... has intrinsic value and is a valuer in his own right."'
(quoting Stern, On Value and Human Dignity, 10 LISTENING 74, 83 (1975))); Willard
Gaylin, In Defense of the Dignity of Being Human, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1984, at
18 ("The word 'dignity' traditionally alluded to the inherent nobility and worth that had
been generally ascribed to our species."); Paust, supra note 77, at 147 ("[FIor those who
need an initial approach to definition [of human dignity], however incomplete, the effects
which flow from an actual implementation of respect for each person, and thus the equal
dignity, value, and worth of each person, come closest to an initial meaning."); Herbert
Speigelberg, Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, 9 PHIL. F. 39, 42-
43 (1971) (noting that dignity comprises, at least in part, the ancient view that humans have
a superior status among species in the world); cf Speigelberg, supra, at 52-53 (Sartre's
existentialist philosophy affirms human dignity, according to Sartre, by "opposing free con-
sciousness to the brute fact of Being.").
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The distinction between humans (whom a person must treat as she
would want herself to be treated) and other objects in the universe
(which she may use however she likes) is a fundamental principle of
law as we know it.188
d. Dignity In Practice
While the Campbell dissent's analysis of how executions may vio-
late human dignity seems unwieldy, one can use many of the same
factors in a much simpler and more manageable framework. Besides
deliberate torture, which is obviously unconstitutional, 8 9 a method of
188. As Kant put it: "For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them
should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as
an end in himself." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
101 (HJ. Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) (emphasis in the original). For a
concise summary of Kant's argument, which identifies the distinction between rational and
non-rational beings as the foundation of morality and law, see Fletcher, supra note 183, at
174-75; see also Gaylin, supra note 187, at 19 (determinism threatens the critical notion of
personal responsibility upon which the law relies); Kenneth Henley, The Value of Individu-
als, 37 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 345 (1977) (assertion, without further reason, of
the value of individuals is a necessary predicate for valuing anything at all); John T. Noo-
nan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1011, 1025 (1993) ("The
criminal law depends on a belief in free will. If a human will is impaired, the human being
cannot be fully responsible.").
This distinction has more than merely theoretical importance. For society to function
properly, each person must recognize the unique respect she owes other people. The law
cannot catch and punish everyone who violates the rights of others; rather, the law, and
therefore organized society as a whole, must instill in all people a self-regulating moral
instinct founded on mutual respect-in other words, mutual recognition of the dignity of
all.
189. Any intent on the part of the state to deliberately or recklessly inflict more pain
than necessary would be per se cruel and unusual. This bare minimum is accepted by
virtually all of the cases. See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,430 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting) ("[N]o court would approve any method of implementation of the death
sentence found to involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives.");
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,464 (1947) (allowing second attempt at
electrocuting condemned prisoner after botch because there was "no purpose to inflict
unnecessary pain"); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("punishments of torture"
banned by the Eighth Amendment); Gardner, supra note 91, at 116 ("It is an inappropriate
application of the criminal sanction to impose a crueler sanction simply to inflict more
suffering upon the offender. Retributive justifications for punishments that are no more
than emotional appeals to vengeance against the offender are condemned almost univer-
sally."). Infliction of excess pain need not be deliberate, however, to violate the Eighth
Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,319 (1986). Under certain circumstances, an
intent to cause pain could be inferred from a state's actions. For instance, if the state's
experience with a painful method of execution is extensive enough, and less painful alter-
natives are widely known and easily useable, a court could infer the intent to cause pain
from the continued use of the old method without any other compelling reasons for doing
so. If the statute mandating a particular method of execution was passed before alterna-
tives were widely available, as is generally the case, intent would be more difficult to infer.
If the legislature, however, had recently amended or reconsidered the law, or engaged in
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execution can violate human dignity in three ways.
The first is through mutilation. Mutilation involves the dis-inte-
gration of the body. It can be as subtle as scarring or discoloration of
the skin, or as gross as dismemberment or decapitation.
The second way to violate human dignity is through excessive vio-
lence. 190 Violence is the brute physical force applied by a state upon
the body of the prisoner. If human dignity is destroyed and human
morality undermined to the extent that a state treats the prisoner as
an object rather than a person, then no aspect of the death penalty is
more pernicious than when people see a state's execution apparatus
restraining, jerking, burning, breaking, or puncturing the human body.
Mutilation may leave a person looking more like a piece of meat than
a human being, but mutilation is only the visible result of an act of
violence. It is during the violent act itself that the State actually treats
the person as if she were a piece of meat.
Third, dignity is violated to the degree that the prisoner, as a per-
son, loses control over her own body. We consider our bodies to be
our most private sanctuary, where our personal autonomy is inviola-
ble.191 Few things are more disturbing to a person than when,
whether as a result of an accident, a medical procedure, a dream, or
any other reason, she loses control of her muscles or bodily func-
tions. 92 When a state's execution apparatus takes away control of the
body's functions in the throes of death, the prisoner's pathetic flailings
and excretions, even if unconscious and painless, underscore the pure
physicality of the body and rob the prisoner of dignity in the most
visceral sense. This kind of degradation includes involuntary urina-
tion, defecation, and spasms of all kinds.' 93
its own fact-finding, then it would be easier to find the existence of intent to cause pain
from the continued use of the old method.
190. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
191. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 305 (1990)
(Brennan, J., with Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("'The inviolability of the per-
son' has been held as 'sacred' and 'carefully guarded' as any common-law right."); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) ("The integrity of an individual's person is a
cherished value of our society.").
192. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., with Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dis-
senting) (listing factors causing perceived indignity to comatose patients in persistent vege-
tative states, including "'invasiveness of life sustaining systems ... upon the integrity of
[the] body.., and the submission of the most private of bodily functions to the attention of
others."' (quoting In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987))).
193. See, e.g., Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[Cyanide-
induced t]etany may be manifested by opisthotonos behavior, muscular contractions so
severe that the body is 'arched backwards like a bridge,' with contractions of sufficient
force to 'compress and fracture the vertebrae.' Other possible manifestations of tetany
include 1) carpal pedal spasm, in which the muscles of the hands and feet contract so
severely that they bend and twist in an unnatural and painful manner, and 2) 'sardonic
smile,' in which the lip muscles are pulled tightly away from the teeth.") (citations omit-
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2. The Importance of Dignity
a. Early Recognition of Dignity-Deliberate Cruelty
For thousands of years human societies have recognized that dig-
nity in the execution context has aspects unrelated to the infliction of
pain. The death penalty as administered throughout history often in-
cluded not only gratuitous pain, but also grotesque post-mortem muti-
lations, both varying in severity and gruesomeness with the
seriousness of the offense. 194 Clearly these additional indignities
ted); TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 177 (death row inmate noting that as part of Missouri's
lethal injection procedure "'[tjhey put a catheter in your penis and a plug in your ass so
you don't shit all over yourself in front of their witnesses, because that would just ruin the
sterile effect of execution."') (emphasis in the original); id. at 36 ("The [Tennessee electric
chair's] seat is ... perforated so that when the victim loses control of his bowels and
bladder, liquid waste will pass through the chair. . . This feature.. . presents a more
hygienic image to witnesses."); James & Nasmyth-Jones, supra note 88, at 90 ("'Dancing'
on the end of the rope [during hanging] may, in some cases, be decerebrate twitching or
'fitting' rather than struggling. .. ."); see also supra note 87; supra note 172.
194. See, eg., BISHOP, supra note 88, at 71-72 (Roman law prescribed entombment alive
for vestal virgins violating vow of chastity); DAVID D. COOPER, THE LESSON OF THE SCAF-
FOLD 3-4 (1974) (burning at the stake was considered a lesser punishment than dis-
embowelling, since the woman burned at the stake was strangled by a chain before the
flames reached her); LAURENCE, supra note 88, at 2 (ancient Egyptian prisoners deprived
of burial after execution, leaving bodies exposed to wild animals); id, at 3 (Roman parri-
cides punished by throwing prisoner into a sack with a dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape); id.
at 17 (Swedish Code of 1734 divided capital crimes into three categories, punished, respec-
tively, by decapitation, decapitation followed by exposure or burning of the body, or ampu-
tation of a hand followed by decapitation); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted'" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 853 (1969) (woman
convicted of treason in England in 1685 sentenced to burning alive, the traditional punish-
ment for women, but King "commuted" sentence to beheading); id at 854 (punishment for
treason by men was hanging, cutting down just before death, disembowelment, burning of
the bowels in front of the prisoner, beheading, and finally quartering). As Blackstone put
it: "In very atrocious crimes other circumstances [beyond mere hanging] of terror, pain, or
disgrace are super-added:.., being drawn or dragged to the place of execution.., and in
murder, a public dissection." Granucci, supra, at 862 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 369 (1769)). This attention to injuries upon the body
even beyond any possible perception by the condemned prisoner demonstrates the value
of dignity in the eyes of the public at that time (as they endeavored to take it away) no less
than does the public's current concern with preserving dignity.
Even today, the nation of Rwanda uses different methods of execution for different
capital crimes. Hanging is used for most capital convicts, while shooting is used for those
who commit "genocidal killings." Jerry Gray, Rwanda Plans to Try Thousands For Mas-
sacres, New Leader Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1994, at Al.
In nineteenth century England, the connection between dignity and the method of
execution was quite explicit. For instance, hanging was considered appropriate for com-
moners but beneath the dignity of aristocratic criminals. See COOPER, supra, at 4 (be-
heading was the punishment for treason, a crime of aristocrats; when three commoners
were convicted of treason in 1817, they were first hanged "as common criminals" and then
beheaded); id. at 7-8 (at one nobleman's execution, people refused to believe, right up to
the end, that he would be hanged); BIsHOP, supra note 88, at 35-36 (noblemen executed by
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could only have meaning for the people witnessing them, rather than
for the prisoner, whose life had already ended.
b. Maximizing Dignity-The Dilemma of Punishment
In the last few centuries, however, the law has come to realize not
merely the importance of human dignity to the individual, but also the
powerful effect that a state's treatment of human dignity has on the
larger society.
When a state punishes, it faces a dilemma in trying to maximize
human dignity and respect for law. The notion of human uniqueness,
so vital to the durability of any society based on law,195 is threatened
by recognition of our physical nature. We are, in fact, made of mere
matter, like any other object or animal. It is hard to disguise the fact
that we must eat, drink, and breathe to survive, and we all ultimately
die and revert to being inanimate objects. This recognition of both
our mortality and our similarity to all other things in the universe un-
dermines our sense of uniqueness, and thus our sense of dignity.
This problem-the conflict between our need to see ourselves as
more than mere physical bodies and the fact that we are as rooted in
physical and temporal reality as any animal or plant-manifests itself
in the dilemma of punishment. In order to punish a person, the law
must assume that she is an autonomous being possessed of something
which non-humans do not have-the freedom and autonomy to
choose her actions. Without freedom to act, there can be no responsi-
bility, and without responsibility, no punishment. In other words, the
law "dignifies" people through punishment, distinguishing them from
non-rational beings and holding them to a higher standard of
behavior.196
beheading were treated with much greater respect by the viewing public then those con-
demned to hanging); id at 119-22 (distinctions between low block method of beheading
(i.e. victim on ground), used either by those of lesser status or where extra punishment was
merited; high-block method (kneeling with head lowered), used for royalty; and kneeling
with head up, used for the execution of Anne Boleyn).
Similarly, slaves and noncitizen in Ancient Greece convicted of capital crimes were
either burned at the stake or crucified, while aristocrats were banished (the functional
equivalent of death in an outside world of wild animals and hostile peoples, see id. at 30)
or, for especially well regarded convicts, allowed to take poison. I& at 36.
American history also provides examples. Major John Andre, a British spy captured
by the Continental Army during the American Revolution, wrote to General Washington
asking to be shot, as a soldier would be, rather than hanged as a spy. Although Washing-
ton felt constrained by military rules, he decided not to reply, thus sparing Andre's feelings
by allowing him to believe, until the very hour of his execution, that he was to die honora-
bly before a firing squad. FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL You ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF
EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 147-50 (1990).
195. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
196. See Gardner, supra note 91, at 107-08 ("[Plunishment in effect honors the choice of
the criminal because it completes the rational consequences of his act. To the extent that
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If the law's scheme of attaching punishment to crime dignifies
people, however, actual physical punishments can cause the opposite:
a loss of dignity. When the law focuses on the body, taking advantage
of the human body's physical and temporal vulnerability in order to
inflict punishment, the punishment emphasizes not the prisoner's au-
tonomy and free will, but the fact that she is a mere physical object
like any other.
In short, holding people responsible for their actions makes them
seem more human; while punishing them physically-whether
through mutilation, violence, or deliberate infliction of pain-makes
them seem less human. The more dignity people see in each other,
the more likely they will be to respect each other and respect the law;
the more we are encouraged to treat each other as mere things, the
more we will disrespect each other and the law.'97
c. Modem Recognition of Dignity
As a result of the modem recognition of the importance of pre-
serving dignity even in punishment, western nations have gradually
moved from using a wide variety of physical, public punishments for
various crimes-which one might think would be most effective at in-
timidating the populace into obedience-to using imprisonment as the
only physical punishment. Imprisonment, alone among physical pun-
ishments, (1) does not involve direct physical action upon the body,
and (2) remains hidden from the public. The law has recognized,
therefore, that the brutality of physical punishments can backfire and
he chooses to commit his criminal act, the law respects his personal choice by punishing
him."); Gaylin, supra note 179, at 19 (determinism threatens the idea of personal responsi-
bility upon which the law relies); see generally Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in
PHIL. OF LAW 659 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross, eds., 3d ed. 1986) (criminals have a "right" to
be punished, and this right is a fundamental underpinning of all human rights).
One commentator advocates allowing condemned prisoners to kill themselves so as to
maximize dignity under the circumstances. See Gardner, supra note 91, at 110-12. This
suggestion harkens back to ancient Egypt, where the first death sentence in recorded his-
tory simply ordered the condemned person to commit suicide. KRONENWEIrER, supra
note 34, at 71.
Interestingly, prison officials have always gone to great lengths to insure that the con-
demned prisoner does not commit suicide before the execution. In one case, a prisoner
who had just tried to kill himself by cutting his own throat was dragged into San Quentin's
gas chamber still bleeding, so that he could be killed by lethal gas before he died of blood
loss. DRIMMER, supra note 194, at 61.
In fact, some suicidal murderers may commit their crimes precisely for the sense of
importance (and hence dignity), otherwise lacking in their lives, that the death penalty
gives them. Cf. White, supra note 19, at 877. Another writer suggests that making execu-
tions less painful and more humane, particularly by using anaesthesia, might mitigate this
problem, since much of the "thrill and notoriety" surrounding the death penalty would be
lost. KEVORKIAN, supra note 184, at 46-47.
197. See supra note 188.
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cause a lessening of mutual respect among people, leading to greater
lawlessness. The solution has been to hide the punishment and to re-
move it from the physical body.
One glaring exception to this trend is the persistence of the death
penalty in the United States. 198 Even American capital punishment
procedures, however, indicate the law's discomfort with the physical
nature of the punishment.199
Both of the methods of execution in use at the time of the Eighth
Amendment's adoption, hanging and shooting, have always been car-
ried out so as to minimize the prisoner's perceived indignity, even at
the risk of causing additional pain.200 All hangmen since the nine-
teenth century have tried to minimize the possibility of decapita-
tion,20 ' and the concern survives to this day. Indeed, the Campbell
court listed the risk of decapitation as a factor in its decision (conclud-
ing that it was negligible) without explaining why this was a concern at
all, since presumably decapitation would render the prisoner instantly
198. See Ursula Bentele, Race and Capital Punishment in the United States and Africa,
19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (1993) ("The United States stands alone among Western
democratic states in retaining, and carrying out, the death penalty for ordinary crimes dur-
ing peacetime.").
199. See MARQUET ET AL., supra note 140, at 31 (at Texas electrocutions, a guard would
stuff cotton into the prisoner's nostrils to trap blood gushing from ruptured veins in the
brain); Bessler, supra note 19, at 359-65 (contending that state governments try to preserve
capital punishment by hiding it); John Lofland, The Dramaturgy of State Executions, in
STATE EXECUTIONS VIEWED HISTORICALLY AND SOCIOLOGICALLY 273 (1977) (each as-
pect of the way modern society treats the death penalty evinces a profound discomfort
both with death in general and with the penalty itself, while earlier societies openly em-
braced both); ZIMRING & HAWKrNS, supra note 19, at 11, 15 (the psychological need for the
death penalty is satisfied by the mere existence of the death penalty statute, as shown by
the fact that (1) many nations retain such statutes long after they stop actually executing
prisoners, and (2) people rarely take notice or object when death sentences are com-
muted); id. at 14 (see discussion contained in supra note 19); Denno, supra note 19, at 677
("Today's executions are sterile, invisible events."). For more of the ways executioners try
to disguise the messy reality of the execution process, see supra note 193.
200. Ironically, concerns with avoiding pain on the one hand and with preserving
human dignity on the other can actually conflict in the execution context. See supra note
177. As the above examples show, the law has placed greater importance upon dignity
than upon avoidance of pain, in direct contradiction to what the Campbell majority held.
See also Ecenbarger, supra note 19, at 10 ("For the past century, there have been sporadic
attempts to come up with neater ways to execute human beings, but most of these seem to
be aimed at placating the squeamish public rather than easing the pain of the
condemned.").
201. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 717-18. For another odd example of the concern with
avoiding post-mortem indignities, see Denno, supra oote 19, at 631 n.508 (New York elec-
trocution procedure in the 1960s called for applying the current while the prisoner was
exhaling because if the current was applied when the prisoner had lungs full of air, the
throat would shut while the current was on, then release when the current went off, gener-
ating an unpleasant noise caused by the release of air.).
Spring 1995] IS THE GAS CHAMBER "CRUEL AND UNUSUALT" 855
unconscious, thus ending her agony.2°
Likewise, the traditional firing squad aims for the heart of the
prisoner,20 3 although it is unclear how long or painful death from a
shot to the heart actually is. Any risk of pain would be eliminated by
aiming for the head rather than the heart; and most gun suicides in
fact shoot themselves in the head,20 4 presumably choosing instant un-
consciousness and sure death over the more dignified, but potentially
more painful, chest wound.
America has also sought to resolve the dilemma of physical pun-
ishment by keeping executions hidden from public view.20 5 The hope,
obviously, is that the brutality of the execution process will not rub off
on the general population, a possibility which is far from remote.20 6
202. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
203. See Weisberg, supra note 93, at 23, 24 (Utah procedure).
204. See DAVID LESTER, WHY PEOPLE KILL THEMSELVES: A 1990S SUMMARY OF RE-
SEARCH FINDINGS ON SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR 241 (3d ed. 1992) (quoting J.W. Eisele, D.
Reay, & A. Cook, Sites of Suicidal Gunshot Wounds, 26 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
480-85 (1981)) (74% of gun suicides shoot themselves in the head, while only 18% shoot to
the chest); id. (quoting VJ. Di MAIO, GUNSHOT WOUNDS (1985)) (80% of handgun and
rifle suicides shoot to the head, along with 50% of shotgun suicides).
205. See Denno, supra note 19, at 604-05 (In response to the botched electrocution of
Williams Kemmler, and the resultant public outcry, the press was barred from witnessing
future New York electrocutions.); id. at 403 ("[W]ith television stations in the United
States already broadcasting... executions in other countries, including executions in Iraq,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, it is ironic.., that executions performed by our own
government are deemed inappropriate for television audiences in the United States."
(footnote omitted)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-504 (Michie 1994) (illegal even to publish
details of an execution after witnessing one). Public executions have been banned in the
United States since 1937. Denno, supra note 19, at 676; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 297 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No longer does our society countenance the
spectacle of public executions, once thought desirable as a deterrent to criminal behavior
by others. Today we reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all.").
But this can only be a temporary solution. The idea of secret state actions, hidden out
of fear of what the psychological effects on an informed public would be, is inimical to the
operation of a free society. Besides, with the expansion of mass media, it seems inevitable
that the public will at some point be exposed to the grizzly details of executions. For an
unusual discussion of how resumption of public executions might actually be beneficial to
society, see BISHOP, supra note 88, at 53-63.
206. This dilemma, as I see it, highlights the principal risk associated with the death
penalty; that by differentiating between those human lives worthy of protection and those
that are not, the death penalty teaches that the respect due all people can justly be taken
away by human decisionmaking. Once people accept that it is within the permissible range
of human choice to decide who deserves to live or die, it is a small step for one or more of
them to think that individuals may make the same choices for themselves.
Executions as they are actually carried out underscore and exacerbate the problem.
There can be no more powerful statement of disrespect for the uniqueness of human life,
for merely physical and ordinary nature of the matter composing the human body, than
when the body is shattered by a state, taking control over a body away from the "person"
who owns it. In the mutilated bodies of prisoners, in the contortions and spasms the body
suffers in the throes of state-sanctioned death, the observer sees the raw physical nature of
856 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:815
human beings separated from any notion of "soul," "mind," or any of the other ways we
describe human uniqueness. When a state in effect reduces a person to a pile of mere flesh
and bone, taking away her personhood, the state offers you, the individual watching the
execution, a choice: sympathize with the prisoner, recognize her humanity, and suffer along
with her, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DIscIPLINE AND PUNISH 63 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vin-
tage Books 1979) (1975) ("[T]he people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty [of
death] than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of
power"); WENDY LESSER, PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION 46 (1993) (execution turns mur-
derer into "pathetic victim"); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 19, at 133-34 ("'The death
penalty has the perverse effect of eliciting sympathy for the condemned."' (quoting
CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 86 (1764))), or stifle the in-
stincts that society (hopefully) has spent so much time trying to cultivate in you, and be-
come hardened and indifferent to the apparently horrific suffering of others, see Driggs,
supra note 91, at 1176 ("'[W]itnessing an execution [or reading about it] ... ministers to
morbid curiosity, hardens the heart rather than instructs the intellect, brutalizes the feel-
ings rather than enlightens the conscience. It habituates the beholder and the reader to
scenes of violence. It tends to attract his thoughts to unfit themes."' (quoting Execution of
the Death Penalty, FRANK LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER, July 11, 1885, at 330)). The
result can be only a lessening of respect for others, a respect our society ostensibly wants to
instill in its members for the mutual benefit of all. When those in positions of perceived
societal importance accept and ignore such suffering, they encourage indifference, or at
least passive acceptance, of all types of suffering.
I am not suggesting that the death penalty plays nearly the role in breeding violent
crime as do childhood abuse, poverty, lack of opportunity, racism, and the like. But the
death penalty is a societal message directed at a tiny minority of deranged individuals:
potential murderers who would not be deterred by the prospect of spending the rest of
their lives in prison. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("[F]or many [murderers], the death penalty undoubtedly is a
significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire,
where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the
decision to act. And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by a life pris-
oner, where other sanctions may not be adequate."). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 301 (1972) (Brennan, J.) ("The [death penalty's] concern, then, is with a particular
type of potential criminal, the rational person who will commit a capital crime knowing
that the punishment is long-term imprisonment, which may well be for the rest of his life,
but will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is death. On the face of it, the
assumption that such persons exist is implausible.").
When the State inflicts obvious cruelty on those it has already rendered helpless, the
message to those few deranged individuals may be quite powerful, and not at all what we
intend. Rather than teaching fear of the law, the real lesson may be the potential pleasure
to be had from killing people one intensely dislikes. Anyone skeptical of the connection
between visceral pleasure and executions would be well served by visiting a death row
prison the night a capital sentence is carried out. See JOSEPH B. INGLE, LAST RIGHTS 253
(on the night of the execution of Morris Mason in 1985, "[a]cross the street [from the
prison], a cheering mob of seventy-five to one hundred people were chanting 'Fry the nig-
ger' and 'Kill the coon."'); id. at 245 (at 1984 execution of Velma Barfield, a crowd shouted
"Kill the bitch! Kill the bitch!"); William J. Brennan, Jr., Symposium on Capital Punish-
ment: Forward. Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 7-8 (demonstrators carried signs saying "Save Energy, Use a Rope"; "Fry Him";
and "Let the Juice Flow"); Child Killer Hanged in Washington State, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
6. 1993, at 4 (during hanging of Westley Allan Dodd, demonstrators set off fireworks). If
violent television programs have the dramatic effects that many people think they do on
human behavior, imagine what effect authentic state-sanctioned violence may have.
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3. Dignity Summary
To sum up, a court trying to assess the degree of indignity a
method of execution causes must look at broad issues of bodily integ-
rity, rather than simply assessing the pain the method inflicts. Despite
what Campbell says, history shows the importance of bodily integrity
as distinct from pain, whether one looks at the ancient emphasis on
inflicting post-mortem indignities or at the modem rejection of delib-
erately grotesque punishments.
B. "Cruel and Unusual" Compared To What?
Before a court can judge the available methods of execution,
however, it must decide which methods to include in the inquiry.
The Campbell court seemed to believe, although it was never
stated, that a particular protocol need only be compared to other ways
of carrying out the same method, such as different ways to perform a
hanging.20 7 This is perhaps the smallest possible sample. It results in
the narrowest possible inquiry, and the greatest likelihood that the
court will find the method in question permissible.
At the other extreme, a court might try to imagine all possible
methods of execution,20 8 regardless of their feasibility, and rank them
all.20 9 This would be the broadest possible sample, and would almost
certainly result in a court finding that executions could conceivably be
207. See supra notes 124-25 and the accompanying text. But cf Fierro, 865 F. Supp at
1411 n.26 ("It is not entirely clear to the court how it is to determine whether pain is
'unnecessary' [under Campbell] without some comparison or reference to other methods
of execution. Presumably it is not the case that any method of execution, no matter how
inherently painful, is acceptable as long as it is performed as humanely as possible, without
any more pain than is 'necessary' to carry out that mode of execution.").
208. Although only five methods are currently in use in the United States, people have
been executed in countless ways throughout history. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 88, at 71-
74, 81-83, 126-30, 144-48, 153-54, (burying alive, crucifixion, beating by the public at large,
auto-da-fe (burning alive, often en masse), breaking on the wheel, garrotting, burial up to
the neck (death being caused by the gradual hardening of the soil), encasement between
two walls, "Death of a Thousand Cuts," crushing of the skull by an elephant, boiling alive);
L at 64-69 (Emperor Nero's execution of Marcus Gaius by roasting alive inside a giant
hollow bronze bull, whose horns magnified and distorted the victim's screams to sound like
the roar of a bull); LAURENCE, supra note 88, at 3 (impalement, drowning at sea, precipita-
tion); id. at 220 (embedding in cement); id. at 15 (quartering alive, tearing to pieces by
horses), idL at 228-30 (the "mazzatello"; peine forte et dure, or pressing with iron weights);
James & Nasmyth-Jones, supra note 88, at 81 (throwing into a quagmire); Ecenbarger,
supra note 19 (tying to stake and smearing with honey to attract biting insects). Further,
there is no limit to the ways people could conceivably be killed, and no limit to the human
imagination in dreaming up new ways of killing. See, e.g., BIsHoP, supra note 88, at 29-39(proposing shooting condemned prisoners into outer space, to either explore or simply die
of starvation).
209. For a discussion of what a perfect method of execution would be in a society un-
comfortable with death and the death penalty, see generally Lofland, supra note 199.
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carried out less cruelly. Thus, a court taking this approach would
probably outlaw any particular method before the court.
The answer to how broad a range of punishments the courts must
compare may come from an examination of "evolving standards of
decency."
1. Penry v. Lynaugh and Methodology Review-A Poor Fit
From Trop to Campbell and Fierro, courts have tried to reconcile
the actions of the peoples' representatives, the usual measure of
"community standards of decency," with the command that any un-
necessary cruelty is constitutionally unacceptable. The results have
been confusing and illogical2 10 The fact is that a Penry-type analy-
sis,211 which simply tallies up the decisions of the various state legisla-
tures and says that uniform rejection of a punishment scheme
indicates unconstitutionality, makes little sense in the execution-
method context. "Evolving standards of decency" have no bearing on
the level of permissible excess suffering, since the Amendment de-
mands nothing less than the elimination of all reasonably preventable
pain. 2  It cannot be that the Constitution allows a certain amount of
unnecessary cruelty simply because the state legislatures all want to
inflict a certain amount of unnecessary pain or indignity as punish-
ment. Any unnecessary cruelty is unconstitutional.
The point of creating an Eighth Amendment test for methods of
execution is to look at the continuum of cruelty-infliction and to draw
the line between what is constitutionally acceptable and what is not.
It is assumed for the purposes of methodology review that the death
penalty is proportionate to whatever offense is being punished.213 In
other words, killing is permissible. On the other hand, the deliberate
infliction of any pain beyond what is necessary to kill is not. Each
assumption is absolute, and between them there is little if any room to
maneuver.
2. A Place For Penry-"Feasible" Methods of Execution
Nevertheless, there is a place for legislatively-determined "evolv-
ing standards of decency." Rather than looking to the legislatures to
help decide what society thinks about a particular punishment, the
210. Compare Fierro, 790 F. Supp. at 970 (opinion granting TRO) ("the Eighth Amend-
ment does not require states to adopt the most humane method of execution") with id.
("'[N]o court would approve any method of implementation of the death sentence found
to involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives."' (quoting
Furman, 408 U.S. at 430 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)).
211. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; supra note 165 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 189.
213. See, e.g., Campbell, 18 F.3d at 683 ("Campbell does not argue that the punishment
of death is disproportional [sic] to the crimes of which he was convicted.").
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courts should use the actions of the states to decide how far states
must go in researching and implementing new, less "cruel and unu-
sual" methods of execution. With little or no prompting from the
courts, nearly every state has at one time or another changed meth-
ods.214 "Society" has obviously felt the need from time to time to ex-
periment to reduce the barbarity of executions, although political and
economic pressures have obviously placed limits on the effort. Courts
can recognize "evolving standards of decency" as Penry demands by
considering for comparison purposes only those methods of execution
that the states have already found feasible, i.e., those methods cur-
rently in use nationwide.
This approach would give proper deference to the states' legisla-
tures, as well as obviating the need for judicial speculation about
whether a new, untried method is superior to one already in use.215
Further, a court could allow an individual state to counter the pre-
sumption of the feasibility of a particular out-of-state method by
showing a compelling state interest in keeping its current method; an
interest which the court would have to weigh, however, against the
relative cruelty involved in the continuing use of that method. To
date, however, no state has ever offered a concrete reason why it
needed to use one particular method over another, 6 so it seems un-
likely that the need for such a balancing test would ever arise.
C. The Constitutional Yardstick-How Cruel Is Too Cruel?
Once a reviewing court has reviewed all of the feasible methods
of execution-those currently in use by the various states-and has
ranked them by relative cruelty, the final question becomes where on
the spectrum of cruelty the line between acceptable and unacceptable
214. See Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1406 ("From 1970 until the time of trial [1993], twenty-
five states had changed or added a method of execution."); supra note 116.
215. If, later on, a state invented a new method of execution and decided to implement
it, the courts could defer judgment until it was in use for a reasonable period of time, and
then allow a challenge to the new method only after sufficient evidence of its relative cru-
elty became available. The court could then judge it against the method in use elsewhere;
if found more cruel, it would be banned, but if found less cruel, the court would mandate
its adoption nationwide.
216. It seems odd that states defend the use of the gas chamber, the gallows, and the
electric chair at all, since lethal injection equipment is actually the cheapest to implement
and maintain. See TROMBLEY, supra note 19, at 39 (giving the prices for a new lethal
injection system ($30,000), electric chair ($35,000), gallows ($85,000), and gas chamber
($200,000)); id. at 99 (Missouri saved $270,000 by switching to lethal injection rather than
rebuilding its 50-year-old gas chamber).
One commentator mentions an interesting argument in favor of hanging, ascribed to
unnamed "penologists and police officials," that among the various methods of execution,
hanging is the most effective as a deterrent because the sensation of choking is the easiest
for a criminal to imagine. See BISHOP, supra note 88, at 111.
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methods falls. In other words: Which method is to be the constitu-
tional yardstick?
The original understanding of the Eighth Amendment was the
historical view that the Amendment prohibited any method which
either was, or would have been, considered "cruel and unusual" when
the Amendment was adopted in 1791.217 Under the historical view,
hanging and shooting should be the standards against which to judge
all more modem methods.
Although the narrow historical view of the Amendment was spe-
cifically abandoned in Weems,218 it may have continued vitality in the
context of methodology review for several reasons. First, the cases
following Weems have dealt almost exclusively with proportionality,21 9
presumably because proportionality is a much more flexible and pow-
erful line of inquiry than simply comparing a penalty to those in use in
1791. The historical test, however, remains as a minimum standard
below which "evolving standards of decency" may never fall.2 0
This remaining historical aspect of Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence may seem of purely academic concern, but in Harmelin v. Mich-
igan221 Justice Scalia writes that he would like to end proportionality
review altogether" (cheerfully upsetting eighty-four years of prece-
dents beginning with Weems), limiting Eighth Amendment review to
examining types of punishment against a historical standard .23 Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined Scalia's opinion, and Justice Thomas, whojoined the Court after Harmelin, probably shares their view.
Although the Court is unlikely to embrace this strict historicism,
the Harmelin plurality's restrictive vision of proportionality review, as
217. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; supra note 58 and accompanying text.
218. See icL
219. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. But see infra note 222.
220. "At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment considered cruel
and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted." Penry, 492 U.S. at 330.
221. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
222. See id at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("The Eighth Amendment contains no propor-
tionality review."); id. at 992-93 (arguing that Weems did not actually create a line of pro-
portionality jurisprudence until over sixty years after it was decided).
Justice Scalia adds that he would preserve the Court's proportionality decisions re-
garding the death penalty, specifically Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding the
death penalty disproportionate to the rape of an adult woman) and Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty disproportionate to non-"trigger-man" felony-murder with-
out intent to kill), although he gives no reason for the distinction between capital and non-
capital cases. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 993-94. He adds: "We would leave [proportional-
ity review] there, but will not extend it further." Id. at 994.
223. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965-92 ("original intent" of the Eighth Amendment did
not include a proportionality guarantee); see also id. at 986 ("[T]he proportionality princi-
pIe becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values.").
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set out by Justice Kennedy,' 4 may have a similar effect in practice: to
end the Court's review of statutes under the Eighth Amendment
outside the death penalty context.22s Thus, the long-dormant histori-
cal view of the Eighth Amendment, and the question of which kinds
of punishment violate that view under all circumstances, may be the
last live area of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Further, the lower courts, when faced with such an obviously un-
settled (and unsettling) area of the law as execution methodology re-
view, have tended to fall back on the historical acceptance of a
particular method in upholding its constitutionality, whether out of a
hidden desire to re-establish the pre-Weems standards or out of mere
habitual deference to the status quo.226
224. Under Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), courts decided proportionality using
three factors: (1) whether the imbalance between the crime and the sentence gives rise to
an inference of disproiortionality, as well as how the sentence compares to others (2) in
the same jurisdiction and (3) in other jurisdictions. Id. at 292. The Harmelin plurality opin-
ion altered the test so that (1) becomes the threshold test. If there is no "inference of gross
disproportionality" from the sentence on its face, courts need not consider (2) or (3).
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. It is unclear whether any future sentence actually imple-
mented by a state will ever invoke such an inference, since a sentence of life in prison
without possibility of parole for a first-time offender caught with one-and-one-half pounds
of cocaine apparently passes muster. See id.
225. "While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a swift death sentence to Solem, Justice Ken-
nedy prefers to eviscerate it, leaving only an empty shell." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018
(White, J., dissenting).
226. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. I view the Campbell majority opin-
ion as a historical-opinion-by-defatilt in the same vein as Gray. See supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text.
Note that Campbell is the only federal case other than Wilkerson to rule on the consti-
tutionality of one of the historically accepted methods of execution. Since Wilkerson was
decided at a time when the purely historical view of the Eighth Amendment was in force,
Campbell is the only case in which a historically accepted method was in jeopardy of being
outlawed. It is possible, although it requires looking beyond the text of the opinion, to
consider Campbell as standing for the proposition that anything acceptable in 1791 is ac-
ceptable today, Justice Scalia's view. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text. If this
is in fact what the Campbell majority intended, it is unfortunate that they did not say so,
since parts of the opinion are nonsensical if read literally, and can only be characterized as
willful misreading of the cases it purports to rely. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 705-06, 706
nn.25 & 27 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Perhaps I see Campbell as a historically based case because it is so structurally similar
to the early method of execution cases decided when the method was new and untried. In
Kemmler, Gee Jon, and Daugherty, each court was able to examine the method in question
at it was supposed to work in theory and in the absence of any messy evidence to the
contrary. The district court in Campbell put itself in a similar position by excluding virtu-
ally all evidence and deciding the case as if hanging were a newly discovered method of
execution. Accord Campbell, 18 F.3d at 713 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Despite the fact
that the evidentiary hearing was not conducted before a jury, the district court excluded
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 any evidence providing examples of slow, painful
strangulations which had occurred in past hangings (including one ordeal lasting thirteen
minutes). Although this evidence was the only direct evidence relating to the risk that
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In many areas of constitutional law, a return to eighteenth-cen-
tury standards would curtail judicial review and, many would say, con-
stitute an abdication of the Supreme Court's responsibility to protect
individual liberties. Certainly, both hanging and the firing squad
would automatically survive constitutional review. However, the gas
chamber, the electric chair, and lethal injection, the methods used in
the vast majority of American executions, would be entitled to no
comparable deference. Each would be judged against hanging and
shooting as to their relative cruelty, and any method found to be more
cruel than either would have to be abandoned.
Additionally, even a historical account of the Amendment might
have to take the full panoply of "human dignity" concerns described
above into account. The concern with dignity in death, after all, seems
to go back well before Justice Brennan's Furman concurrence, Trop,
or even the adoption of the Eighth Amendment itself.' 7 If this is
true, and dignity was a significant legal concern dating back to our
common law origins in England, then even the most die-hard histori-
cist must use some sort of dignity analysis when looking at methods of
execution, something which even the liberal Judge Patel neglected to
include in the Fierro test.2
A second possible way to select a baseline of constitutionality is
to use the "evolving standards of decency" relied upon by every
Eighth Amendment case since Weems. The question might be re-
phrased as follows: Would a modern "reasonable person" find the
method of execution "indecent"? Trop seemed to espouse this point
of view, searching out the "reasonable person's" view by turning to
so-called "objective standards"-in that particular case, the laws of
other nations. 22 9 Other courts have included sociological data,"0 and
the Campbell dissent openly used "the tools of philosophy, religion,
logic, and history" in determining the standard.231 However, the cur-
rent Supreme Court is unlikely to accept such an openly subjective
approach.
Assuming that the historical standard no longer governs the
Eighth Amendment, which is almost certainly the case, there is a third
alternative besides the rigidly historicist and unduly vague "evolving
standards" points of view. If a state may not inflict unnecessary cru-
elty, and if a less cruel alternative method exists which is both politi-
hanging will cause a lingering death, the court excluded it because Campbell did not know
every detail of the procedures used in these hangings.").
227. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text.
229. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
230. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S.
at 345-54 (Marshall, J., concurring).
231. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 697 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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cally and economically feasible (i.e. a method widely used by other
states), then any method other than the least cruel alternative must be
cruel and unusual.
In other words, only the least cruel method among those in wide-
spread use ought to be constitutionally acceptable. A state's refusal to
adopt a newer, more humane method in the absence of any counter-
vailing concerns232 should be viewed as equivalent to deliberate cru-
elty, violating the Eighth Amendment.
D. Summary-An Eighth Amendment Test for Methods of Execution
My proposed test, then, can be summarized as follows: A state
violates the Eighth Amendment if it uses a method of execution which
either causes or is intended to cause-
1) pain, or
2) violation of bodily integrity, such as-
i) mutilation,
ii) violence upon the body, or
iii) subversion of the prisoner's control over her body,
-beyond that inflicted by any other method which is reason-
ably available (i.e. looking at whatever methods the state legisla-
tures have found to be feasible).2 3
VII. Is the Gas Chamber, or Any Other Method of
Execution, Cruel and Unusual Punishment?
Under my test, only the least cruel of the five methods of execu-
tion currently in use in the United States (hanging, shooting, electro-
cution, cyanide gas, and lethal injection) would be constitutionally
permissible. Since each has been found economically and politically
feasible somewhere in the United States, the decision to kill using any
but the least cruel among them can only be a deliberate infliction of
unnecessary cruelty in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
By all accounts, lethal injection seems to be the least cruel
232. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
233. 'Iis would be the test under the current "evolving standards of decency" under-
standing of the Eighth Amendment. Under the pre-Weems understanding of the Eighth
Amendment favored by the Supreme Court's conservative wing (see supra notes 221-23
and accompanying text) the test would be as follows: A state violates the Eighth Amend-
ment if it uses a method of execution which either causes or is intended to cause-
1) pain, or
2) violation of bodily integrity, such as-
i) mutilation,
ii) violence upon the body, or
iii) subversion of the prisoner's control over her body,
-beyond what traditionally accepted methods of execution (in use in 1791)
cause.
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method.23 There is little or no mutilation of the body; physical vio-
lence is limited to the insertion of the needle; and perhaps most im-
portantly, the prisoner is given a fast-acting barbiturate to kill the pain
before the poison enters the body." 5 The use of an anaesthetic is par-
ticularly important, since lethal injection is the only method which in-
cludes a direct effort to prevent pain. 36
234. Lethal injection has caused much ethical debate and discussion in the medical
community since it demands the active participation of some sort of medical personnel in
the killing process. See STAFF OF CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note
84, at 5 ("The California Nurses Association has requested specific language [in the lethal
injection bill] stating that registered nurses should not be expected to administer lethal
injections or to train others how to do so."); David C. Anderson, Who Wears the Blindfold
at Executions?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26 1995, § 4, at 5 ("A group of Illinois doctors challenging
that state's lethal injection law argues that the procedure was invented 'to give an aura of
medical respectability to a truly nasty deed."'); Fisher, supra note 19, at B5 ("Doctor's
groups, objecting to the physician's potential role, have warned members not to participate
in [lethal injections]."). This is strictly an issue for doctors, however; such considerations
should play little, if any, part in the constitutional debate. Nonetheless, the concern does
give rise to another problem: since doctors generally refuse to participate in the actual
killing process, there is a greater chance that mishaps will occur. See Weisberg, supra note
93, at 27.
235. See Jim Dwyer, Watching A Killer Die, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al, A27
(Texas procedure uses sodium thiopental, an anaesthetic, followed by potassium chloride
to stop the heart and pancuronium bromide, a muscle relaxant, to stop the breathing);
Fisher, supra note 19 (same chemicals used in Oklahoma); Anderson, supra note 234 (same
chemicals but with the second and third reversed); Michele Parente, "Missouri Model"
Considered, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1995, at A5 (Missouri procedure, "widely considered
... the model" nationwide and potentially to be followed in New York, uses sodium
pentothal, Pavulon, and potassium chloride, in that order). But see Silagy v. Thompson,
No. 90-C-5028, 1991 WL 18418, *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1991) (noting Illinois lethal injection
procedure causes several minutes of unnecessary pain; implying that no painkiller is used).
236. This is not to say that mishaps have not occurred, or that no unnecessary pain is
inflicted. See TROmBLEY, supra note 19, at 14-15 (describing botched executions involving
repeated failure to properly insert the needle, up to 47 minutes, incorrect mixtures of
drugs, and leaking apparatus); Denno, supra note 19, at 627-28 n.496, 657 (prominent Illi-
nois anesthesiologist's affidavit for a federal court case says that Fred Leuchter's computer-
ized lethal injection machine, in use in at least four states, "would render inmates incapable
of screaming and cause them severe pain before they died."); Anderson, supra note 234
(prisoner Stephen McCoy's reaction to the drugs used in his Texas execution included vio-
lent gasping and choking); Marshall Frady, Death In Arkansas, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22,
1993, at 105, 129-30 (at Arkansas execution of the severely brain-damaged Ricky Ray Rec-
tor, Rector moaned for an hour as executioners repeatedly stuck the needle in his arm
trying to find a vein; executioners finally cut his arm open with a scalpel); Jim Dwyer,
Firsthand Look at Final Moments, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 26, 1995, at A4 (Clifton Russell
stuck repeatedly with needle for 20-25 minutes); Ecenbarger, supra note 19 (painful
botches by injecting chemical into muscle instead of a vein, and by injecting chemicals in
the wrong order; another inmate stuck repeatedly with needles for 45 minutes before suita-
ble vein found); Fisher, supra note 19 (at least ten of the nation's 138 executions by lethal
injection have been botched); Weisberg, supra note 93, at 27 (intense pain can result from a
clogged needle, as happened in the Texas execution of James Autry in 1984, or if the needle
is accidentally inserted into a muscle instead of a vein).
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By contrast, death by cyanide gas seems quite painful (or at least
uncomfortable in the extreme) and is certainly degrading and hor-
rific.3 7 Thus, the gas chamber, along with electrocution,238 hang-
ing,239 and shooting,240 must necessarily fail the constitutional test
under "evolving standards of decency."
However, as mentioned above, it is possible that the Supreme
Court could, in the narrow context of methodology review, return to a
pre-Weems historical standard.241 In that case, the Court would judge
the gas chamber not against lethal injection, but against hanging and
shooting, the methods in use in 1791. In that case, one might well give
up and decide that nothing could be worse than hanging and shooting,
and that since the modern methods were adopted in an attempt to
humanize executions,242 the historicist position leaves nothing left to
decide.
For an account of the debates over lethal injection when it was first adopted, see ZIMR-
ING & HAWKINS, supra note 19, at 121-23.
237. See supra notes 87, 130-31, and 193. The Fierro and Campbell tests rely heavily on
distinguishing the prisoner's conscious and grotesque reactions to pain from unconscious
contortions and spasms, since the latter, no matter how degrading, are considered legally
irrelevant. See supra notes 104-40. Under my test, the distinction would be drastically less
important, since both pain and unconscious spasms violate human dignity. Having
watched part of the trial, including most of Dr. Baskin's testimony, I can report that there
is something Orwellian about government researchers asserting under oath that the writh-
ing, grimacing prisoner dying in the gas chamber is not actually in pain. Judge Patel noted
this disturbing phenomenon (although she did not (or could not) discuss it in a substantive
way) in the Fierro opinion:
While defendants offered theoretical evidence as to why inmates in the gas cham-
ber should lose consciousness within seconds, they made little attempt to square
this theory with the numerous objective eyewitness observations and contempo-
raneous medical records submitted by plaintiffs. It is theoretically possible to in-
terpret any of the seemingly conscious activities cited above in isolation as the
actions of an unconscious inmate .... After a certain point, [primary defense
expert] Dr. Baskin's attempt to explain away all of the possibly conscious activity
begins to look less like the rational thought process of a detached scientist and
more like the biased rationalizations of a professional who is wedded to his own
particular theories....
In a particularly revealing moment in the testimony, Dr. Baskin was ques-
tioned about his refusal to euthanize [sic] rabbits for experiments .... Dr. Baskin
conceded that he did not run an objective test to determine whether the injected
rabbit was experiencing pain .... Rather, in response to counsel's question,
"[HMow do you know it was a painful death?", Dr. Baskin responded "[y]ou had
to be there," and explained that seeing the animal and hearing the sounds it made
was enough to convince him that the manner of death was painful.... Dr. Baskin
displayed greater familiarity with this phenomenon as it related to rabbits than to
human beings.
Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1403-04.
238. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 88-92.
240. See supra notes 218-26.
241. See supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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Not so. As shown above, subsequent scientific investigations can
render those early judgments obsolete. Further, most courts have up-
held methods based on how they are supposed to work, rather than
how they work in actual practice. When one contrasts even an ideal
cyanide death with the ideal hanging approved by the Campbell court,
the result is clear. The protracted and ugly scenario that unfolds be-
hind the glass at San Quentin is far more cruel than either the quick
and painless hanging described in Campbell or the ideal electrocution
described in Kemmler.
Whatever the Eighth Amendment test looks like when the Fierro
appeal is decided, whether by the Ninth Circuit or by the Supreme
Court, the gas chamber is the most vulnerable to constitutional attack
under even a historically based standard. One might say that by insist-
ing over the years on judging methods of execution under ideal cir-
cumstances, the appellate courts are hoisted by their own petard by
the evidentiary rulings in Fierro, where the gas chamber's cruelty
seems inescapable in the best of circumstances. Whether the appel-
late courts preserve the modem view of the Eighth Amendment or
return to a historical viewpoint regarding executions, the judges and
justices will probably have little choice but to recognize that death by
cyanide gas is, under any logical and intellectually honest test, cruel
and unusual punishment.
